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ABSTRACT 
Using a new regional database of national and European parliament elections on 
NUTS 2 level in 28 countries, we test the main theories explaining the electoral 
support for the European far right. Accounting for differences between the extremist 
(ER) and populist radical right (PRR), we find evidence in support of both economic 
insecurity and cultural backlash theses. The ER vote is associated mostly with 
economic insecurity and the PRR vote mostly with cultural backlash. Whereas micro 
and macro-level analyses have often produced conflicting results, unemployment, 
immigration and income inequalities have significant and robust effects at the meso 
level, indicating that the factors determining the far right vote might at large be 
operating at a sub-national level. In line with the “contact” and “salience-of-change” 
hypotheses, the effects of economic insecurity are more pronounced in regions that 
undergo sudden changes compared to those with high levels of immigration. 
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1.! INTRODUCTION 
We investigate the electoral trajectory of the far right (FR) party family by accounting 
for variation in the electoral outcomes between its two major components, the 
extremist right (ER) and the populist radical right (PRR) throughout the European 
continent at the regional level. Although the differences between these variants are 
“notable” (Ellinas, 2015) or even “fundamental” (Mudde, 2007, p. 31; Mudde, 2008, p. 
2), there is also convergence between the two, since both propagate nationalist ideas, 
are against socio-cultural pluralism, in favor of restrictionist immigration policies and 
share anti-establishment stances (Minkenberg, 2013, p. 13; Greven, 2016, pp. 4-5).  
 
Conceptual frameworks explaining the electoral evolution of FR parties can be 
grouped into “demand-side” and “supply-side” accounts (Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 
2007). Demand-side explanations combine factors that reflect different sets of far-
reaching transformations that occurred in the advanced postwar era. Among them, 
changes affecting citizens’ economic status and their socio-cultural identity breed the 
ground for the rise of new parties. Electoral support for FR parties can be perceived as 
a reaction against changes associated with socio-economic and cultural insecurity 
(Inglehart & Norris, 2016), since FR parties present themselves as a counterbalance –a 
“silent counter revolution” (Ignazi, 1992)- to the rising economic risks and cultural 
shifts. Supply-centered explanations are divided into two subgroups (Mudde, 2007; 
Rydgren, 2007): the first focuses on structures of political opportunities related to 
exogenous factors that mitigate or extend prospect for support of the FR parties; the 
second concentrates on the FR parties themselves, i.e. their organizational buildup, 
leadership structure, as well as their ideology, party manifestos and discourse. Our 
paper rests in the demand-side branch of the literature. On a theoretical level 
we contribute in three ways: we investigate the role of economic insecurity and 
cultural backlash in isolation and in combination; we argue about the relevant 
similarities and disparities between PRR and ER; we examine how determinants of the 
FR operating at a regional level, might go unnoticed by individual or country-
level research. Our empirical contribution lies with providing strong and robust 
evidence in favour of the predominant theories of the causes of the FR vote, and by 
confirming both likenesses and differences between the two variants of the FR. 
 
We aim at complete geographical coverage, on a level constituted by 266 NUTS 2 
regions in 28 European countries between 1999 and 2014, yielding a sample of 1170 
first (national) and second (European) order elections - a sample size well above any 
other used in comparative analysis on the subject with aggregate data so far. In his 
analysis covering national elections of 19 Western European countries in the timespan 
between 1970 and 2000, Golder (2003) was the first to show that the two different 
subgroups of the FR party family “have clearly enjoyed different patterns of electoral 
success” (Golder, 2003, p. 443). We build on this idea and project it to the meso level – 
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“the most neglected level of analysis” (Mudde, 2007, p. 217; Eatwell, 1998, p. 4, 8) – in 
order to assess the predictions of the main theories explaining demand for the FR.  
 
Drawing upon older studies and existing findings on the background of the FR vote 
(von Beyme, 1988; Jackman & Volpert, 1996; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2000; Lubbers et al, 
2002; Golder, 2003; Swank & Betz, 2003; Arzheimer, 2008, 2009; Dinas & van Spanje, 
2011), we check the prevailing research directions on socio-economic grievances and 
cultural backlashes (Inglehart & Norris, 2016; de Vries & Hoffmann, 2016; Golder, 
2016), as well as their contextual interaction in order to clarify the driving forces that 
facilitate the rise of FR parties all around Europe. Using a battery of explanatory 
variables, we find consistent and robust evidence indicating both convergence of PRR 
and ER electoral fortunes with respect to certain covariates (e.g. unemployment) and 
disparities with respect to others (e.g. immigration, inequalities, other economic 
adversities). This highlights the need to complement the endeavor that treats the two 
categories as a whole with analysis that clarifies both their differences and common 
grounds.  
 
Our research complements and enriches explanations of electoral support for FR 
parties by investigating the effect of measures of perceived economic and cultural 
threat at the regional level. According to historians, meso-level analyses offer “an 
ideal mix of specificity and generality” therefore curing shortcomings of both micro 
and macro levels analyses (Little, 2010, p. 16). In comparative politics, a turn towards 
the sub-national level has increased sample sizes and provided more accurate data for 
comparison (Snyder, 2001). Given the size of our comparative sample, we consider the 
regional level as a crucial size unit of analysis for several reasons. Firstly, for its ability 
to capture effects that might evade both individual and country-level analyses. For 
instance, individual unemployment status fails to capture the effect of the threat of 
unemployment to those still employed, and country-level unemployment might mask 
this effect by pooling regions within the same country. Regional data take into account 
socioeconomic threats that voters are facing at a relative level of proximity. Secondly, 
working with regional data is more appropriate for making comparative analysis 
since they focus on units of comparable size. Furthermore, the regional level can better 
capture within-country variation in income and inequalities and provide a more 
nuanced interpretation of the FR vote. Finally, other significant, time-invariant 
socioeconomic or political factors operating at a regional level, might be unobservable 
or very difficult to measure quantitatively. Failing to control for such, region-specific 
heterogeneity, might result in omitted variable bias and affect the estimation of our 
included regressors. Panel-data techniques on a regional level, reduce such biases, 
even in cases where the specific regional characteristics cannot be identified explicitly. 
 
As a generic category, the meso level includes several geographical sub-levels and size 
units that extend from the regional up to the micro-local level (Savelkoul et al., 2017, 
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p. 218). Demand-side meso-level explanations can involve regions, cities, towns, 
municipalities, voting districts, neighborhoods, etc., capturing any spatial grading 
between the citizens and the state (Biggs & Knauss, 2011). In order to reveal sub-
national variations that explain the FR vote at the national electoral arena, we use data 
on European NUTS 2 level. Analyses at a finer grid are both informative and available 
for single countries and specific periods (Thijssen & de Lange, 2005; Biggs & Knauss, 
2011; Hangartner et al., 2017; Savelkoul et al., 2017). Their contribution stems, among 
others, from their strength to account for different dynamics operating at distinct 
geographical levels (Kaufmann & Goodwin, 2016). For instance, contact effects have 
been found to be more likely in smaller units on analysis (Kaufmann & Harris, 2015: 
1566; Schlueter & Scheepers, 2010: 293); as the size of unit increases, threat perceptions 
of white natives are enhanced (Ha, 2010: 30). One might be similarly interested to 
check how economic and cultural backlashes act at different levels of aggregation 
(King & Wheelock, 2007; Savelkoul et al., 2017). However, for all the interest such 
approaches present in terms of originality and accurate insights, studies of the FR 
parties/vote that focus on smaller spatial units within the meso level are not 
comparative due, mostly, to limitations in obtaining exhaustive and reliable data for a 
large panel of countries. Our paper comes to fill this gap, by providing a pan-
European comparative analysis at the finest grid for which a large number of diverse 
socioeconomic controls are available. 
The size and the geographical coverage of our sample allow us to test for a minimalist 
set of determinants that affect the FR vote – those that are common to all cases in our 
sample. Our evidence is robust to a large variety of alternative specifications, 
modelling choices and classifications. In particular, we check for structural differences 
between national and European parliamentary elections, as well as between Eastern 
and Western Europe inter alia. Since the empirical literature has often produced 
conflicting results about the effects of key socioeconomic variables on the FR vote with 
both aggregate and individual-level data, the robustness of our results indicates that a 
great part of the socioeconomic determinants of the FR vote might be acting at a 
regional level and in distinct ways with respect to the two FR variants. 
 
2.! THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1 Driving forces in the rise of the far right: theoretical accounts  
Early theoretical accounts of the electoral rise of FR parties initially moved around two 
distinct directions. The first uses the psychoanalytical arguments of the “authoritarian 
personality” (Adorno et al., 1950) for analyzing extremism and radicalism as 
pathologies of modernity. The second emphasizes the vulnerability of the endangered 
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lower classes to intolerance; susceptibility to extremism should be found among those 
with low levels of sophistication and high levels of “status anxiety” in the era of 
industrialization (Lipset, 1963, pp. 92-94, 131-137). Drawing upon this tradition, 
scholars considered far rightism as a “normal pathology” of the liberal industrial 
societies, as a “potential” that is inherent in the western world, and at the same time 
opposed to its values (Scheuch & Klingemann, 1967, pp. 12-13).  
Subsequent explanations focused on the historical trajectory (von Beyme, 1988) and the 
ideological makeup (Mudde, 2000) of the European FR. Dominant studies emphasize 
the right-wing “populist challenge” (Mény & Surel, 2002; Taggart, 1995) and discuss 
the most relevant case studies of FR parties and movements in the European continent 
(Hainsworth, 2000; Caramani & Mény, 2005). At the same time, a considerable number 
of contributions explore the electoral path of FR parties, voting preferences of their 
electorate, changing attitudes that affect moving towards and away from the FR and a 
broad palette of factors (social, psychological, political, economic) correlated with the 
FR (Coffé & van den Berg, 2017; Art, 2011; Swank & Betz, 2003; Lubbers et al., 2002; 
Lubbers & Scheepers, 2000; van der Brug et al., 2000; Jackman & Volpert, 1996; 
Kitschelt, 1995; Betz, 1993).  
Crystallization of two explanatory directions towards synthetic explanations. Au courant 
interpretation of the electoral support for the FR is separated in two accounts 
(Inglehart & Norris, 2016). The first one identifies as potential FR supporters the so-
called “losers of modernization” (Betz, 1998, p. 7) as well as those who are “rather 
secure” but “can still lose something” during the processes of modernization and 
globalization (Minkenberg, 2000, p. 187; Rydgren & Ruth, 2011, pp. 206-207). The 
second account addresses emotions, which mobilize citizens’ fear, resentment, or 
hatred against the Other. Immigrants and ethnic minorities are stereotyped as an 
“ethnic threat” (Mudde, 2007, p. 210). FR parties adopt a xenophobic rhetoric blaming 
immigrants for weakening the country’s culture and economy, thus attracting votes of 
natives with negative sentiments towards immigrants (Cochrane & Nevitte, 2014; 
Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). 
Understanding the appeal and the rising demand for the FR in contemporary Europe 
associated with economic and socio-cultural phenomena required more synthetic 
explanations. Economic misery that causes concerns related to the personal economic 
situation or the national economy, on the one hand, and socio-cultural fears on the 
other, intertwine (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Barfort & Hobolt, 2017), rendering 
the interaction between them a possible driving force of the PRR and ER parties. The 
likelihood to vote for FR parties “is rooted in both economic and cultural 
developments” since both are able to affect the social status which is a key factor that 
evokes electoral support for the FR parties (Gidron & Hall, 2017).  
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Interactions between unemployment rates and levels of immigration might reinforce 
support for the FR, but their causal links are neither linear nor very clear (Sniderman 
et al., 2004). Several studies have often produced “inconsistent results” (Golder, 2003, 
p. 433) with respect to the impact of immigration, unemployment and their interaction 
(Givens, 2005). If the unemployed and those suffering from economic hardship blame 
immigrants for their personal misfortune, FR parties that support restrictionist 
immigration policies have a chance to perform well within the segments of the 
economic losers (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2000, p. 66). Nonetheless, insofar as migration 
is more likely to take place during periods of economic prosperity and as migrants 
reasonably concentrate in prosperous regions (Brückner et al., 2009, p. 5; Cochrane & 
Nevitte, 2014, p. 2), anti-immigrant parties could be chosen by both “losers” and 
“winners”, depending on whether the perceived threats are viewed as an “individual 
threat” or a “group-level threat” (Semyonov et al., 2006, pp. 426-428).  
With respect to the role of immigration, recent literature has come to make a 
distinction between sudden changes and long-term co-existence in the so-called 
“salience-of-change” (Newman & Velez, 2014) and “contact” (Kaufmann, 2017) 
hypotheses. According to the former, it is actual changes in rather than levels of the 
immigrant population that intensify the possibility of immigration being identified as 
a threat. According to the latter, natives in areas with increased diversity have more 
chances to interact with minorities, thus improving natives’ attitudes towards 
immigration. In this context, deteriorating economic conditions and increasing 
cultural heterogeneity stemming from a “drastic change” (Newman & Velez, 2014, p. 
293; Hopkins, 2010) in immigrant population in the natives’ society, are expected to 
promote anti-foreign sentiments (Semyonov et al. 2006, p. 427) whereas, increased 
contact with minorities is expected to dampen hostility towards minorities and 
immigrants.1  
2.2 Empirical evidence 
Comparative empirical research linking the state of the economy and immigration to 
the FR vote has so far mostly focused on three approaches: survey data that explore 
voters’ attitudes towards the above-mentioned issues, but not linking these issues to 
the prevailing conditions (Tillie & Fennema, 1998; van der Brug et al., 2000); a 
combination of aggregate and individual data that causally link structural conditions 
and individual perceptions to the rise of the FR (Lubbers et al., 2002; Kessler & 
Freeman, 2005; Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Arzheimer, 2009); and country-level 
                                                   
1 Higher number of immigrants increases the opportunity for interaction between natives and non-natives and 
diminishes the tensions between them (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). Despite increased contact with 
immigrants/minorities, feelings of fear and hostility might be preserved since “threats” and “contacts” operate at 
different spatial scale (Kaufmann & Goodwin, 2016) and thus “can be perceived over a greater distance” (Biggs & 
Knauss, 2011, p. 634). 
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contextual data linking structural socioeconomic factors to the FR vote at the highest 
(country) level of aggregation (Jackman & Volpert, 1996; Knigge, 1998; Golder, 2003).  
In the relevant literature there is an attempt to uncover the strongest predictors among 
the conditions – economic or cultural – that facilitate the electoral support for the FR 
parties. For some authors, the “economic insecurity” hypothesis, specified as the 
“labor market competition” approach, is deemed a “zombie threat” since it has 
“repeatedly failed” to find empirical evidence that verifies it (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 
2014, p. 17). Numerous empirical studies rejected the link between high or rising 
unemployment or tightening conditions in the labor market and FR parties’ success 
(Knigge, 1998; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2000; Lubbers et al., 2002; Arzheimer & Carter, 
2006; Coffé et al, 2007). Other analysts, however, confirm a connection between 
economic insecurity and electoral support for FR parties (Jackman & Volpert, 1996; 
Swank & Betz, 2003, Inglehart & Norris 2016). The “cultural backlash” hypothesis is 
considered a factor that correlates positively with FR party support; fears about 
globalization, immigration or ethnic minorities and reactions against cultural shifts 
embracing or protecting minorities/foreigners contribute to the electoral rise of the FR 
(Inglehart & Norris, 2016; de Vries & Hoffmann, 2016).  
Despite the falsification (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Chapin, 1992) or the verification 
(Arzheimer 2008, 2009; Coffé et al., 2007; Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Lubbers et al., 2002; 
Swank and Betz, 2003; Dinas & van Spanje, 2011) of the above-mentioned accounts, 
what emerges after years of research on the topic is the complexity of the empirical 
research results: the combination of cultural and economic threats (Golder, 2003; Jesuit 
et al., 2009; Gidron & Hall, 2017), the way these threats are perceived - as “egocentric” 
or “sociotropic” (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014), 
phenomena like the “nostalgic deprivation” which prove that the driving force of 
support for the FR is not a current economic threat, but the discrepancy between the 
current and the past social status (Gest et al., 2017, p. 2).  
 
2.3 Conceptual concretization and hypotheses 
This section develops our expectations concerning the effect of contextual variables on 
the electoral fortunes of the FR. Building on the two dominant theories of the demand-
side literature, the economic insecurity and the cultural backlash theses, we test - 
independently and in conjunction – their relative contribution to explaining the 
electoral performance of the FR and its two major components, the PRR and the ER. 
The dichotomy between ER and PRR (Mudde, 2007) is drawn according to their 
distance from historical fascism. The ER parties - also named “neo-fascist” (Taggart, 
1995; Golder, 2003), “autocratic-fascist” (Minkenberg, 2013), “traditional” (Betz, 1994) 
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or “old” extremist right parties (Ignazi, 2010) - display elective affinities with historical 
fascism, whereas the PRR parties “deny any lineage” with the fascist legacies (Ignazi, 
2010, p. 32). Parties displaying ideological affinities with fascism are “in essence anti-
democratic” since they oppose to fundamental rights of liberal democracy (Mudde, 
2007, p. 31). On the other hand, PRR parties present themselves as “anti-system” 
(Ignazi, 2010, p. 27), that challenge the establishment (Betz, 1994, p. 4; Betz, 1993, p. 
413) by defending anti-political stances (Taggart, 1995, p. 35), programmatic radicalism 
(Betz, 1998, p. 3) and anti-partyism (Ignazi, 2010, p. 33), without having the ambition to 
tear down the political system (Givens, 2005, p. 20). Detailed analysis of our 
classification of FR parties, a list of parties classified as PRR or ER and the elections in 
which they participated is provided in the Appendix (Section A2.1 and Table A2).  
Economic insecurity: Economic insecurity is related to several “adverse events” (job 
loss, family breakdown, illness), among which unemployment has a key position 
(Western et al., 2012; Osberg, 2015; Εhlert, 2016). What is more, as an economic and 
labor market condition, unemployment is expected to extend its impact beyond its 
actual victims - the unemployed. By tapping the fears and insecurities of workers 
being at risk or perceiving themselves as such, unemployment is expected to amplify 
the electorate of the FR (Jackman & Volpert, 1996; King et al., 2008). These findings 
advocate that unemployment, both as a personal condition and as a socio-economic 
phenomenon, constitutes a fertile ground for increasing the stakes of the FR in the 
electoral market. Since both variants of the FR party family blame processes of 
globalization and denationalization for labor market tightening and job losses at the 
national and regional level, we expect that rising unemployment would have a 
positive electoral effect on the PRR and ER parties. 
Hypothesis 1: Both variants of FR parties, the PRR and the ER, are expected to receive more 
electoral support in periods and regions of higher unemployment.  
Cultural backlash: Increase in the FR vote share is nourished by “retro reactions” 
against the cultural change that took place during late modernity (Inglehart & Norris, 
2016; Ignazi, 2010). As the shift from materialist values to non-economic, cultural 
issues became predominant (Inglehart 1990), nostalgia for the eroded traditionalist 
values developed, offering a breeding ground for reactionary political entities to 
conquer new audiences. With their nationalist credo, FR parties provide a 
psychological “comfort zone” to those social strata that look for fixity and in-group 
stability.  
In this conceptual framework, immigration is central. This overall phenomenon 
should not only be strictly associated to the real number of immigrants, their religious 
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or other characteristics2 - the objective components of immigration - but at the same 
time be understood as a heuristic entity symbolizing a series of threats. High levels of 
immigration and/or growth in immigrant population trigger support for the FR. 
Benefits are expected for both the anti-immigrant and xenophobic variant (PRR) and 
the ultra-nationalist and hostile towards immigrants version (ER), opted either as a 
reaction to governments failing to protect national interests or as a policy preference 
congruent to parties promising to “get back control”.  
Hypothesis 2: Both PRR and ER parties are expected to receive more electoral support in 
periods and regions of higher levels of immigration. 
Economic and cultural insecurity interacting: The consequences effected by 
unemployment and immigration are not isolated from one another. Studies that 
examine the nexus between them3 regarding their effect on the support for FR parties 
have shown that unemployment increases their electoral strength when the number of 
immigrants is large (Golder, 2003, p. 460; Lewis-Beck & Mitchell, 1993). Sniderman et 
al. (2004) have shown that economic and cultural threats are often highly correlated to 
such an extent that are mostly treated as a single factor, whereas Genovese et al. (2016) 
find that reinforcing effects between economic and cultural insecurities are conditional 
upon the geographical proximity with immigrants and the level of centralization in 
their distribution within the native population. High economic insecurity, driven by 
high unemployment, is expected to accentuate hostility towards immigrants that are 
portrayed as rivals culturally and economically by both the PRR and the ER. Hence 
high immigration and abrupt, sizeable increase in the levels of immigration are 
expected to rise the support for the FR.  
Hypothesis 3: The effect of immigration on the support for PRR and ER parties is expected to 
be more pronounced in periods and regions of higher unemployment. 
Socio-economic inequalities: Inequalities enhance grievances related to the socio-
economic and cultural context and affect social demand for redistribution (Golder, 
2016). A growing gap between high and low incomes affects preferences for 
redistribution; voters feeling negatively affected by increasing inequalities turn 
towards parties that favor redistributive policies. What is more, rising inequalities 
increase disaffection for the political mainstream and produces frustration for the 
status quo; people blame the established parties and the political elite for what they 
perceive as socio-economic injustice. 
                                                   
2 Lucassen and Lubbers (2012), for instance, found that the proportion of Muslim immigrants does not make any 
difference to the electoral preferences for the FR and that cultural threats are even stronger in countries with a 
limited number of Muslim population. 
3 Empirical research found modest evidence with respect to how much new immigrants affect labor market 
opportunities, the wages of the natives and of previously installed immigrants (Card, 2001, p. 56-57). 
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FR parties do not address inequalities uniformly. PRR parties adopt a fiercely populist 
rhetoric that denounces the growing gap between rich and poor and propagate 
redistributive policies, which promote economic protectionism and welfare 
chauvinism (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2018; Otjes et al., 2018). Among a panoply of 
adversaries, political, financial and media elites bear the blame for inequalities in the 
discourse of PRR parties that “stand up for ordinary people and their common sense” 
(Betz 2018, p. 14). PRR parties hence benefit from rising inequalities (Han, 2016). ER 
parties, on the other hand, support state interventionism and a corporatist economic 
doctrine without clear references to redistribution (Piccolino & Henrichsen, 2017). 
They do not address inequalities as symptoms of socioeconomic development. On the 
contrary, ER parties are “anti-egalitarian” (Jamin, 2013, p. 44) and believe in natural 
inequalities, which constitute a fundamental category in the ER ideology, as “part of 
the natural order” (Mondon, 2016, p. 18; Golder, 2016, p. 479). Inequalities are 
embedded into the ideological credo of the ER (Carter, 2005, p. 17), which favors the 
exclusion of any Other perceived “unwelcome and inferior” (Mondon, 2016, p. 18). 
Hypothesis 4a: Higher levels of income inequality increase support for PRR parties. 
Hypothesis 4b: ER parties are not expected to benefit from higher income inequalities.  
 
3.! DATA AND EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1!Data description and summary statistics 
For our analysis, we use electoral data covering 28 countries and 266 NUTS 2 regions.   
Detailed sources are given in the online Appendix. 
Regional economic, demographic and social data, as well as European NUTS 2 
shapefiles for choropleth maps were taken from Eurostat. The socioeconomic 
covariates include unemployment rate, immigration, GDP per capita in purchasing 
power standards, effective tax rate, GDP inequality between NUTS 3 sub-regions, the 
ratio of wage share to primary income, a Gini coefficient for personal income 
inequality, one dummy capturing whether the regional GDP per capita grew in the last 
period and another indicating that the election was for a national rather than the 
European parliament.  
[Table 1 here] 
For a detailed description of the variables and their construction see our online data 
Appendix. Summary statistics are given in table 1. Detailed statistics are given in the 
online Appendix A1.  
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Political and economic conditions exhibit both cross-sectional and time variation. 
Figure 1 plots the average regional populist radical and extreme right vote shares for 
duration of our sample (2000-2013). The PRR vote is spread all over Europe. The ER 
vote is more concentrated in Central and South, South-Eastern Europe. Both exhibit 
cross-sectional variation. 
[Figure 1 here] 
Figure 2 plots the average European FR vote from 1999 to 2014. The average European 
ER vote share has exhibited a constant to slightly increasing course. The PRR and FR 
vote on the other hand, exhibit a clear upwards trend with the latter starting at 5% in 
1999 and tripling to 15% by the end of the period in question. 
[Figure 2 here] 
Figure 3 plots the average European FR, PRR and ER vote by country in descending 
order of FR electoral shares. 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
3.2!Empirical framework 
To estimate the demand for FR in European elections, we employ a Tobit model that is 
suited to deal with the mass of zero values of the dependent variable, in regions where 
no FR parties compete. To control for unobserved heterogeneity between regions, we 
employ Honoré’s (1992) panel-Tobit estimator.4 In our online Appendix, we give a 
detailed presentation of the methodological possibilities and challenges when 
estimating the FR vote, the methods chosen, the criteria used and comparative 
advantages and disadvantages with respect to alternative methodologies.  
We estimate the PRR and ER vote shares under hypotheses 1 and 2, using the 
following basic econometric framework: !"#$ = &' + &)*Unemp# $0) + &1*Imm# $0) + &**Econ_Var# $0) **
+ &:*Parliamentary*elections*Dummy# $0) + C# +D#$                              ( 1 ) 
where !"#$ denotes PRR or ER vote share in region E in year F, Unemp# $0)  is the 
region’s lagged unemployment rate, Imm# $0)  is lagged immigration, and 
                                                   
4 This is specifically designed to control for fixed effects between regions and is not subject to possible biases from 
introducing a large number of regional dummies in non-linear models, known as the “incidental parameters 
problem” (Neyman & Scott, 1948; Greene, 2004). Our robustness section repeats estimations using Tobit models 
with regional dummies. 
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Econ_Var# $0) * is a vector of economic controls (GDP per capita, tax rate, between 
NUTS 3 sub-regions income inequality, the wage share of primary income and a 
dummy for GDP growth in the last year) and C# denotes region-specific fixed effects.  
We control separately for levels of GDP per capita and growth because the former 
captures regional levels of wealth, whereas the latter captures regional development 
and is an indicator of losses or gains in wealth and of the economic prospects of the 
region, since growth rates are typically correlated in time.5 The effect of losses and 
gains on the FR vote is captured by a dummy for positive growth. As a robustness, we 
repeated all regressions using growth rates instead of the dummy. Finally, we include 
a dummy capturing possible effects between national and European parliamentary 
elections.6  
To test hypothesis 3, we add an interaction between unemployment and immigration. 
Finally, we test for hypothesis 4 by including a Gini coefficient that captures personal 
income inequality. 
Testing the predictions of existing theories of the FR, by no means implies any sort of 
ecological inference. If a region with high unemployment exhibits high FR vote shares, 
we cannot, of course, conclude that it is the unemployed who vote for the FR. Rather 
we say that if theories which predict that the threat of unemployment increases the 
tendency of individuals to vote for the FR are correct, this should manifest in regional 
data: higher unemployment levels should threaten more individuals and we should 
observe higher FR vote shares. The direction runs from the individual to the aggregate 
level and not the other way around.  To demonstrate this and gain some insight about 
how unemployment might affect the FR vote, we use ecological inference in our 
robustness section and show that although unemployment is positively related to the 
FR, in fact the unemployed vote for both variants less than the employed. 
 
 
4.! RESULTS 
We present our results concerning Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 in Table 2. The table reports 
the results of the fixed effects Tobit estimation. Model 1 (columns 1 and 2) tests 
hypotheses 1 and 2. In order to test the effect of immigration on the FR vote, in line 
with the “salience of change hypothesis”, we use changes in immigration levels (where 
                                                   
5 Distinction between the effects of per capita GDP and growth is made in the FDI (Blonigen & Piger, 2014) and 
sovereign debt (Afonso et al., 2011) literature to capture different effects (gravity equation effects vs economic 
prospects and vulnerability to shocks vs ability to repay). 
6 Our parliamentary Elections dummy controls for shifts in vote between national and European parliament 
elections. We confirm structural stability between the two kinds of elections in our robustness section. 
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by levels we mean % immigration over population).7 We measure changes by 
differencing immigration rates (Δ*%Immigration#,$ ≡ * Immigration#,$*–*Immigration#,$0)). 
So that if, for example, the share of immigrants in the population rises from 5% to 6%, 
this would indicate a 1% change of immigration. We denote the variable as Δ*(%Immigration$).  Model 1 tests the effect of unemployment and immigration 
controlling for several socioeconomic and political factors. Both unemployment and 
immigration have a positive and statistically significant effect on the FR vote, 
providing support for both the economic insecurity and the cultural backlash 
hypotheses. The effect of unemployment is strong and statistically significant at 1% 
level. The effect of immigration flow is positive and statistically significant at 5% level 
for PRR parties and at 10% level for ER parties. 
[Table 2 here] 
Both FR variants are also associated with higher GDP per capita. Furthermore, 
increases in tax rate and the wage share lead to rises in the ER vote, whereas growth 
has a negative effect on it. The ER vote responds to different measures of economic 
insecurity: unemployment, increased taxation, output contraction. It is also associated 
with higher wage shares, possibly indicating a connection with labour-intensive 
production. The PRR is related to higher unemployment, but also to higher inflows of 
immigrants. It is related with higher levels of GDP per capita, possibly indicating that 
it is a reaction of richer regions-years to unemployment and immigration. 
At first sight, FR’s response to unemployment and GDP might seem paradoxical, 
particularly since the FR vote has been associated with the votes of blue collars, lower 
social strata and their lower incomes. Our finding however, is not as surprising as it 
might seem at first: unemployment, GDP levels and GDP growth capture different 
effects. Whereas unemployment and declining GDP trends capture economic 
insecurity, the levels of GDP per capita do not necessarily do so. Consider for example, 
a poor rural region with stable or even improving economic conditions (and below 
average GDP per habitant). This region does not experience economic insecurity. On 
the other hand, an affluent region, that suffers a dramatic loss of income will 
experience severe economic insecurity, despite the fact that it might remain in the 
higher quantiles of income distribution. This is in line with Lubbers et al. (2002), who 
concluded that in more prosperous countries/regions people are more keen to vote for 
the FR parties, if they are afraid “to lose what they have gained in times of economic 
prosperity” (Lubbers et al., 2002, p. 371). In our data, unemployment rates and the 
indicator of GDP growth/contraction are better proxies for economic duress and 
insecurity. 
                                                   
7 Robustness regressions using levels (% immigration) show that our results regarding hypotheses 1, 2 and 4 are 
not affected. Hypothesis 3 is tested using both flows and levels. Our results there indicate differences between 
levels and flows, in line with both the “salience of change hypothesis” and the “contact” hypotheses. 
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To gain more insight about how GDP might affect the FR vote, our robustness section 
attempts two exercises. Firstly, we explore the interaction of GDP and unemployment. 
PRR and ER parties differ in that respect: For PRR parties the interaction is negative 
and statistically significant, implying that the marginal effects of GDP become negative 
in areas with high unemployment (see figure 4). This is quite intuitive since, in areas 
already suffering of high rates of unemployment, poverty reflected by lower GDP, is 
likely to raise the PRR vote. For areas with low unemployment the effect of GDP is 
positive, possibly reflecting more general conservative tendencies of such areas. 
[Figure 4 here] 
For ER parties on the other hand, the interaction is not statistically significant, meaning 
that the effects of GDP are positive throughout the distribution of unemployment. This 
implies that more prosperous areas vote for ER parties more, a tendency that is of 
course exacerbated when they go through periods of high unemployment and/or GDP 
contraction as is evidenced by the positive effect of unemployment and the negative 
effect of GDP growth. 
Our speculation is that this finding might reflect changes in the social status linked to 
the magnitude of losses. It might in particular manifest higher status anxiety in areas 
of higher GDP, since individuals might have more to lose; whereas in areas of 
extended poverty and malaise - lower GDP and high unemployment - disenchanted 
individuals could be opting out of the electoral process. 
Furthermore, we break GDP into four quartiles and examine how being in each 
quartile affects the FR vote. For PRR parties, the vote of the highest GDP quartile is 
significantly higher than the vote of the three lowest quartiles. For ER parties there is a 
gradual (almost linear) increase in their vote shares as one goes up the GDP quartiles 
(see detailed discussion and tables in the online Appendix). 
To test hypothesis 3, columns (3) to (7) introduce interaction terms between 
unemployment and immigration. We distinguish between immigration levels 
(%Immigration) and changes in immigration (%Immigration). Model 2 (columns 3 
and 4) introduces immigration as a ratio of foreign citizens to the population. The 
coefficients of the interaction term are negative for both PRR and ER and statistically 
significant for ER parties at 10% level. Although not new in the literature8, this finding 
constitutes somewhat of a paradox. 
We argue our results can be better understood in view of the two recent approaches to 
                                                   
8 Arzheimer (2009) gets a similar negative effect of the interaction between unemployment and asylum seekers. He 
calls it “ceiling effect” and remarks that it goes against predictions of ethnic competition theory. Similarly, 
Inglehart and Norris (2016) find negative interaction of economic insecurity and anti-immigration attitudes. 
 
 15 
immigration and the FR vote, namely contact and salience-of-change theories described 
in the introduction. According to contact theory, increased contact with immigrants 
(captured here by higher immigration levels), familiarizes the natives with minorities 
and can act as a buffer to the effect of immigration on the FR vote. So high levels of 
immigrants per capita are not expected to increase the FR vote. To the contrary, they 
should reduce it, if these levels reflect long-run interaction with minorities. According 
to the salience-of-change theory, sudden changes in immigration should act as a shock 
to the native population who now turn towards xenophobic parties. 
To explore further this finding, model 3 reports the results of our estimations with 
changes in immigration instead of immigration levels. The first thing to note is that 
substituting changes for levels by-and-large leaves the effects of other covariates 
qualitatively unaffected (with the exception of the effect of between regions inequality 
on PRR vote, which retains its negative sign and becomes statistically significant).  
Also note that in column (5), the coefficients for immigration and the immigration-
unemployment interaction on the PRR vote are not statistically significant. The reason 
for this is that immigration and the immigration-unemployment interaction are highly 
correlated (0.84 in Table A1.2 in the Appendix). This multicollinearity produces high 
standard errors when both immigration and its interaction with unemployment are 
included. However, when we include immigration without an interaction term 
(column 1), the effect is positive and statistically significant. Also, when we include the 
interaction of unemployment and immigration alone, this is found significant (column 
6), indicating that the lack of statistical significance reported in column 5 is due to the 
multicollinearity problem and not to a lack of positive effect of immigration on the 
PRR vote. Model 3 offers an interesting distinction with respect to immigration. The 
effect of unemployment remains positive, significant and of similar magnitudes as 
before. Including immigration flows rather than levels has a positive effect on the PRR. 
Because of the multicollinearity problem described above, we cannot determine 
whether immigration acts on the PRR vote directly or through its interaction with 
unemployment. The effect of immigration flows on the ER vote is not statistically 
significant, however the effect of the interaction with unemployment is now positive 
and statistically significant. For the ER vote, immigration seems to take effect through 
the mediation of unemployment, indicating that it is economic insecurity that triggers 
the effect of immigration. This is particularly evident since the effect of immigration 
when we include the interaction term is not only insignificant, but also negative.  
[Figure 4 here] 
Figure 5 plots the partial effects of immigration flows and unemployment on the FR 
vote, taking into account their interaction. The plots are derived the estimations 
reported in columns (5) and (7) of Table 2 for PRR and ER respectively. The effects of 
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unemployment and immigration for PRR (ER) parties are plotted on the upper 
(bottom) row. For both parties the effects of unemployment (immigration) increase as 
immigration (unemployment) rises. For PRR parties the multicollinearity between 
immigration and the interaction term increases standard errors and the confidence 
intervals rendering the effects insignificant after a certain level of immigration. As we 
have seen both immigration and unemployment are significant, so this finding has to 
be attributed to the correlation between immigration and the interaction term rather 
than to a weakening relationship between the two covariates (unemployment-
immigration) and the PRR vote. For ER parties the partial effects of both regressors are 
positive, rising and statistically significant. 
The distinction between levels and changes affects only the interaction between 
unemployment and immigration and is discussed in detail in our concluding section. 
With respect to our other regressors, our conclusions remain robust when we 
introduce the interaction term, with the exception of the parliamentary election 
dummy on the ER vote that now ceases to be significant. 
[Table 3 here] 
Table 3 reports the results of our regressions testing Hypothesis 4 for the two party 
families. Model 1 (columns 1 and 2) tests for the effects of inequality, using only 
unemployment, immigration and a parliamentary elections dummy as controls. The 
signs and significance we get from the basic specification are in line with our working 
hypothesis for both PRR and ER parties. The effect of inequality is statistically 
significant at 1% level for PRR parties and insignificant for ER parties: PRR parties are 
affected as predicted by increased income inequality. ER parties are not affected. 
Model 2 adds socioeconomic controls. The results confirm hypothesis 4 for PRR 
parties. The effect of personal income inequality is positive and statistically significant 
at 1% level. For ER parties, the effect is negative and statistically significant at 5% level, 
confirming that increased inequality does not turn the electorate towards ER parties. 
On the contrary ER parties seem lose electoral shares when inequality increases. The 
effect of inequality is more pronounced when we add socioeconomic controls, 
suggesting that omitted socioeconomic variables in model (1) might have biased the 
results downwards.  
How do our findings relate to potential shocks in the economy and abrupt shifts in the 
cultural synthesis of the population? As the estimated &s in Tobit models capture the 
effects of regressors on the latent dependent variable, rather than the observed 
(positive) vote shares, they are not readily interpretable as marginal effects. Table 4 
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presents the effects of a change in our key socio-economic variables.9 
[Table 4 here] 
The table reports the effects on the FR vote of a 50% increase in the median of a 
number of key explanatory/policy variables. Our calculations were based around the 
median to avoid effects of extreme values that are associated with the means. For all 
variables except immigration flows, we predict the effect on the FR vote from a 50% 
increase in each regressor (all other regressors were held constant at their median). For 
immigration flows we examined the effect of a 0.1% increase in yearly immigration 
flows. This was chosen because the median (and mean) immigration flow was 
negative, very small in absolute values, and statistically insignificant, so the effect of a 
50% increase in an effectively zero variable was senseless for our purposes. The 0.1% 
increase in immigration flows corresponds roughly to an increase from median 
immigration flow to the 65% higher percentile of the distribution. It is a level of 
immigration experienced by a large number (>35%) of European regions during 2015 
refugee crisis as projected by Eurostat’s country-level immigration data on our 
regional sample.  
The table reveals that, other things equal, unemployment has a similar effect on PRR 
and ER; a 50% rise in median regional unemployment from 3% to 4.5%, will cause a 
26% and 24% increase in the PRR and ER vote shares (PRR from 4.44% to 5.61%; ER 
from 1.68% to 2.09%). A 0.1% rise in immigration flows (from 0 to 0.1%) will increase 
the PRR vote by 40% and will cause a rise of 45% in ER vote shares. A 50% rise in the 
effective tax rate from 10% to 15%, will leave the PRR vote unaffected but will cause a 
51% rise in the ER vote share. Finally, a 50% rise in growth rates will not affect the PRR 
vote but will reduce the ER vote share by 8%. 
 
4.1!Robustness 
To check the robustness of our results with respect to alternative specifications of the 
models presented and estimation methods, we perform a wide range of robustness 
exercises. The results of all our robustness estimations are presented in detail in 
section A3 of our Online Appendix. To check that our results are robust to alternative 
methods and interpretations, we consider the following:  
Fixed effects estimators. We re-estimate all models presented above, using standard 
                                                   
9 To calculate the estimated effects, we used standard Tobit models with region Dummies because Honoré’s (1992) 
panel Tobit estimator is based on differences and cannot estimate fixed effects and the inverse Mills ratio needed to 
calculate marginal effects. Note (Tables 2 and A7) that traditional Tobits give conservative estimations for βs in 
comparison with Honoré’s (1992) estimator so, if anything, the results we present here will be a conservative 
estimate of the population effects. 
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Tobit models with regional dummies instead of Honoré’s (1992) panel-Tobit 
estimator. 
Immigration levels: We repeat estimations controlling for immigration levels rather 
than changes in immigration.  
Alternative party classification. We use alternative party classification for PRR and 
ER parties. In particular, for all arguably marginal cases of ER parties we repeat all 
estimations classifying them as PRR.  
Structural stability. We check the robustness of our results when we control for 
structural stability (sensitivity analysis) a. between national and European 
parliament elections, and b. between Eastern and Western Europe elections  
Growth rates. We include past growth rates instead of a dummy indicating regional 
economic growth.  
Imputed inequality values. As income inequality data are missing for key electoral 
years in some regions (see Online Appendix), we check robustness by imputing 
missing income inequality values.  
Country effects. We acknowledge that country effects might affect our results in two 
distinct ways: level effects, meaning that different countries might have different 
mean levels of FR, and standard error clustering. Although our panel techniques 
control for the first, we estimate those effects by using random effects Tobit 
models. Furthermore, we examine what happens when we cluster our standard 
errors at different levels (NUTS 3 – or country), using linear fixed effects models. 
Education We check the effects of different levels of educational attainment (tertiary 
vs lower education) on the FR vote. Neither is found significant. 
Ecological inference. As we discuss in section 2.3, finding that the unemployment 
affects the FR vote, does not imply that it is the unemployed who vote for the FR. 
To make this point clearer, we use King’s (1997) ecological inference method to 
examine who votes for PRR and ER parties on a European level. King’s ecological 
inference gives insightful results, presented in table 5. Columns (1) and (2) present 
the results for PRR parties and columns (3) and (4) for ER parties. Column (1) gives 
the percentage of unemployed (Bb in King’s notation) and employed (Bw) who 
vote for PRR, using simple 2x2 ecological inference. We estimate that the 
percentage of the unemployed that votes for PRR is 1.1%, whereas the percentage 
of employed voting for PRR is 8.4%. Column (2) repeats the estimation, allowing 
for the means of the two groups (employed-unemployed) to vary between 
countries. The results are similar. We get analogous results for the case of ER: the 
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percentage of unemployed who vote for ER varies between 0.9% (simple ecological 
inference) and 0.4% (using a country factor variable as a covariate). The 
corresponding percentage for the employed is 2.8%. This suggests that the positive 
relation between unemployment and the FR vote is likely to stem mostly from 
employed voters who feel threatened by rises in unemployment, a story that 
corroborates King et al.’s (2008) finding that it was those were hurt by the crisis but 
still employed that turned towards the Nazis. We present more detailed graphs of 
our ecological inference exercise in the online Appendix. 
Excluding countries with (partial) voting rights for immigrants: One possible cause for 
concern might be that certain countries give immigrants (partial) voting rights. In 
our sample only 3 countries allow immigrants to vote in national elections on a 
discriminatory basis: Ireland, Portugal and U.K. (Justwan, 2015; Arrighi & 
Bauböck, 2017). In European elections, Article 3 of the COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 
(1993), gives EU citizens the right to vote in their country of residence. In those cases, the 
vote observed might not reflect purely voting patterns of the native population. To 
control that our results are robust to changes in voting rights, section A3.12 in the 
online Appendix repeats our basic configuration, excluding Ireland, Portugal and 
the UK in national elections and all European elections. 
Our results are qualitatively robust to all of the above alternatives: Coefficients 
concerning our main hypotheses retain their signs in all specifications tried. In few 
cases, some coefficients lose statistical significance.  
 
5.! DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In order to explain the electoral evolution of the FR, we adopted a demand-side, meso-
level analysis which is so far the least used framework in the comparative study of the 
FR. We expanded the field of study to 28 countries, 40 parties covering both variants of 
the FR party family and 266 regions throughout Europe. 
We examined two central hypotheses in the study of the FR vote: the economic 
insecurity and the cultural backlash. In a literature that often reaches conflicting results 
about the effects of unemployment on a micro or macro level, we find a significant and 
systematic relationship between unemployment and the FR vote share on a meso level 
for both subgroups (PRR and ER) of this party family and both orders (national and 
European) of electoral competition throughout Europe. Coupled with other 
socioeconomic measures, like tax rates, wage shares, and indices of contraction 
positively correlated with the FR vote share, they produce robust, uncontradicted 
evidence that economic downturn and socio-economic conditions of insecurity indeed 
reinforce the FR all over Europe.  
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However, the fact that the PRR and the ER votes are positively associated with higher 
GDP per capita means that the FR is not a sheer expression of economic decline. 
Indeed, the fact that it rises in regions with negative growth rates is an indication that 
voting for the FR might be a response of more affluent regions to economic losses and 
deteriorating economic conditions. We find that PRR and ER parties do not mobilize 
with grievances to the same extent. ER parties are negatively influenced by economic 
growth and positively influenced by higher tax rates and wage shares. From all 
indicators of economic insecurity, the PRR vote responds positively only to 
unemployment. It also responds to immigration which confirms the hypothesis on the 
cultural backlash. In other words, electoral support for the ER parties is mainly 
affected by economic threats, whereas voting for the PRR parties is more influenced by 
cultural threats. 
The added value of examining the combined effect of unemployment and 
immigration on the FR is, on the contrary, not straightforward, according to our 
findings. Economic insecurity does not enhance the effect of immigration on the vote 
for either PRR or ER parties, when we control for the actual sizes of immigration per 
region. This could mean that regions with higher immigration multiply interaction 
among natives and immigrants and assimilate immigrant populations more or 
integrate them better and faster. As a result, they blame them less when 
unemployment rises. Economic insecurity however reinforces the cultural backlash 
when the evolution of immigration is taken into account. We can thus speculate that 
regions with higher unemployment are more sensitive to rises in immigration. The 
shock produced by abrupt increases in immigration flows in areas where 
unemployment also rises drives voters to the most extreme version of FR parties, 
blaming immigrants for unemployment. Our findings move, therefore, in line with 
both the “contact” and the “salience-of-change” hypotheses.  
This evidence might have policy implications for the way and pace with which 
immigrants should be integrated in European societies. A key indicator for 
immigrants’ integration is their participation in the labour market. Allocating more 
resources to integrate immigrants in areas that experience sudden immigration 
increases might prove more effective in combating political extremism than focusing 
on areas with high immigration levels.10 Given that the employment rate of 
immigrants seeking international protection is extremely low and their integration 
process very long,11 policies for social inclusion and integration of refugees and 
migrants have a crucial role for combating extremism in the host countries.  
With respect to the effects of immigration, our analysis highlights that for ER parties, 
                                                   
10 According to OECD/EU (2015), countries with higher number of immigrants have higher employment rate 
among the foreign population than countries with a small number of immigrants. 
11 According to the MEDAM Assessment Report on Asylum and Migration policies in Europe (2017), economic 
integration improves social integration and protects from radicalization of the second generation (p. 57). 
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this is mediated through higher levels of unemployment, a finding that is not 
confirmed for PRR parties. In the case of ER parties, hostility against immigration is 
part of their holistic and solid perception of organic homogeneity for the nation-state 
and ethnic community. Hence ER parties are not simply anti-immigrant but against 
any notion of foreignness and otherness. Our analysis reveals that their vote share 
does not respond directly to immigration rates. It rises with unemployment, taxation, 
the wage share and GDP contraction, while the effect of immigration changes on it is 
mediated through unemployment, indicating that the ER vote is predominantly a 
reaction of voters to economic insecurity. 
Increasing inequalities do not cut across the FR, since the effect is positive and 
significant for PRR but negative and significant for ER parties. This finding is 
important as their differential reaction to income inequality constitutes one of key 
observed differences between the two variants in the FR party family, one that as it so 
happens has its roots on theoretical justification as well. Beyond testifying that PRR 
parties are rewarded for their anti-elite immersion, growing inequalities offer PRR 
parties the opportunity to unfold their narrative denouncing the drivers of inequality, 
such as globalization. One possible explanation for the negative relation between 
inequality and ER could be that when inequalities increase, those benefiting more have 
no reason to be against the status quo by voting ER parties that are completely anti-
systemic, whereas the poor and the less well-off have no incentives to support parties 
that are in favor of inequalities and recognize them as “natural”. 
Adding on previous research that left controversy on the relevance or the prevalence 
of key variables and levels of analysis which better explain the FR vote, we find 
evidence that the effects of economic and cultural insecurity on a meso level are 
positive and robust to all specifications of a demand-side perspective tried, indicating 
that a lot of the underlying processes culminating in the decision to vote for the FR 
might be taking place on a regional level. Our results in particular, are robust for both 
parliamentary and European elections, which could manifest a gradual transformation 
in the bond between voters and FR parties, rather enduring than tactical. In our 
analysis we identified the existence of nuances or even more profound differences 
among the subgroups of the FR party family, a more comprehensive explanation of 
which should be based on the supply-side as well. From a demand-side meso-level 
analysis, however, testing for those determinants that function as a minimalist set of 
factors which are common to all cases in our sample, we conclude that higher levels of 
unemployment, increases in immigration and conditions of personal economic 
inequalities construct the set of reasons that promote electoral support for the FR 
parties.  
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FIGURE 1: AVERAGE EUROPEAN FAR RIGHT VOTE 2000-2013 
PRR ER 
  
Notes: For each region, the average FR vote share in all elections held in our sampled is 
plotted. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on European NUTS 2 level electoral data and Eurostat 
NUTS 2 level shapefiles. 
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FIGURE 2: THE EUROPEAN FAR RIGHT VOTE 1999-2014 
 
Notes: PRR, ER and FR votes as well as valid votes were aggregated to European levels by 
year. For non-electoral years votes were imputed by interpolation. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on European electoral data. 
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FIGURE 3: AVERAGE EUROPEAN FAR RIGHT VOTE BY COUNTRY 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on European electoral data. 
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FIGURE 4: PARTIAL EFFECTS OF GDP AND UNEMPLOYMENT ON THE PRR VOTE 
            Partial effects of GDP           Partial effects of Unemployment 
  
Notes: The graph plots the marginal effects of GDP (left) and unemployment (right) for 
PRR  parties controlling for GDP-unemployment interaction. For ER parties the 
interaction is not statistically significant and the corresponding graphs are omitted 
(provided in the online Appendix).  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on European electoral data and Eurostat 
socioeconomic data. 
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FIGURE 5: PARTIAL EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION 
 Partial effects of Unemployment Partial effects of Immigration 
PRR 
  
ER 
  
Notes: The graph plots the marginal effects of unemployment (left column) and immigration (right 
column) for PRR (up) and ER (bottom) parties controlling for unemployment-immigration 
interaction.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on European electoral data and Eurostat socioeconomic data. 
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TABLE 1: SAMPLE SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      FR vote share 1,170 0.078 0.091 0 0.542 
PRR vote share 1,170 0.063 0.092 0 0.542 
ER vote share 1,170 0.015 0.035 0 0.255 
Unemployment rate 958 0.040 0.036 0.003 0.208 
Immigration 1,036 0.038 0.040 0.000 0.392 
Immigration flow 995 0.001 0.004 -0.075 0.047 
Income inequality 969 0.293 0.034 0.220 0.378 
GDP PPS per capita 1,016 21.767 8.743 4.5 85.9 
Tax rate 981 0.101 0.098 -0.340 0.354 
Between regions inequality 1,020 0.078 0.066 0 0.315 
Wage share 984 0.715 0.098 0.394 0.950 
Growth Dummy 1,169 0.762 0.426 0 1 
Parliamentary election Dummy 1,170 0.673 0.469 0 1 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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TABLE  2. HYPOTHESES 1-3  
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 
 Unemployment-
immigration + Ec. 
Covariates 
Immigration rates Changes in immigration rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)$ (6) (7)$
Dependent variable PRR ER PRR  ER  PRR   ER  
        
Unemployment 2.478*** 1.359*** 2.586*** 1.328*** 2.482*** 2.478*** 1.287*** 
    ratet-1 (0.330) (0.401) (0.362) (0.440) (0.338) (0.330) (0.358) 
%Immigrationt-1   4.874 10.540    
   (4.798) (10.143)    
%Immigrationt-1   -18.379 -15.791*    
   x Unemploymentt-1   (13.822) (8.994)    
Δ (%Immigrationt-1) 0.706** 0.243*   0.533 0.706** -0.460 
 (0.309) (0.139)   (0.605) (0.309) (0.301) 
Δ (%Immigrationt-1)     6.842  22.405* 
   x Unemploymentt-1     (23.888)  (12.227) 
GDP PPS per  0.009*** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.006** 
   capitat-1 (x 103) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Tax ratet-1 -0.184 0.662*** 0.022 0.605*** -0.167 -0.184 0.671*** 
 (0.242) (0.128) (0.218) (0.129) (0.253) (0.242) (0.128) 
Between regions -0.984* -0.609 -0.803 -0.605 -0.991* -0.984* -0.631 
    inequalityt-1 (0.593) (0.478) (0.519) (0.471) (0.592) (0.593) (0.496) 
Wage sharet-1 0.066 0.612*** 0.452 0.675*** 0.080 0.066 0.631*** 
 (0.287) (0.142) (0.319) (0.157) (0.294) (0.287) (0.139) 
Growth Dummyt-1 0.004 -0.076*** 0.003 -0.079*** 0.005 0.004 -0.075*** 
 (0.007) (0.020) (0.007) (0.019) (0.008) (0.007) (0.019) 
Parliamentary  -0.002 -0.007* 0.002 -0.006* -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 
     election Dummyt-1 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) 
        
Observations 780 780 812 812 780 780 780 
Censored 274 394 283 426 274 274 394 
Uncensored 506 386 529 386 506 506 386 
Number of clusters 229 229 229 229 229 229 229 
Region FE yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo R2 0.541 0.418 0.553 0.394 0.541 0.541 0.428 
Joint-significance Wald χ2 83.43 53.07 97.99 48.95 89.44 83.430 56.23 
Notes: this table reports the results of panel Tobit estimations after Honoré (1992) of the European extreme 
right (ER) and populist radical right (PRR) vote shares 2000-2014, testing hypotheses 1, 2 (model 1) and 3 
(models 2 and 3).  Model 2 uses %Immigration (ratio of immigrants to population), and model 3 uses 
Δ(%immigration) (changes in %immigration). Standard errors are given in parentheses below the coefficients. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data.   
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TABLE  3: HYPOTHESIS 4 - EFFECT OF INCOME INEQUALITY 
  MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
  
Basic Model Economic regressors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable PRR  ER  PRR  ER  
          
Income inequalityt-1 0.947*** -0.194 1.011*** -0.696** 
 
(0.119) (0.219) (0.290) (0.299) 
Unemployment ratet-1 1.486*** 2.162** 1.456*** 2.116*** 
 
(0.347) (0.886) (0.391) (0.551) 
Δ (%Immigrationt-1) 0.989** 0.288*** 1.062** 0.092 
 
(0.476) (0.107) (0.453) (0.103) 
GDP PPS per capitat-1 
  
0.007** 0.009*** 
   
(0.003) (0.004) 
Tax ratet-1 
  
0.057 0.600*** 
   
(0.280) (0.128) 
Between regions 
  
-1.882*** -0.917** 
    inequalityt-1 
  
(0.663) (0.454) 
Wage sharet-1 
  
0.115 0.565*** 
   
(0.289) (0.120) 
Growth Dummyt-1 
  
0.006 -0.075*** 
   
(0.010) (0.019) 
Parliamentary election  0.013** -0.039*** 0.015* -0.023*** 
   Dummyt (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) 
     Observations 705 705 656 656 
Censored 253 396 233 353 
Uncensored 452 309 423 303 
Number of clusters 248 248 229 229 
Region FE yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo R2 0.607 0.519 0.569 0.470 
Joint-significance Wald χ2 91.05 95.84 80.81 186.08 
Notes: this table reports the results of panel Tobit estimations after Honoré (1992) of the 
European extreme right (ER) and populist radical right (PRR) vote shares 2000-2014, testing for 
the effect of income inequality. Columns (1) and (2) report the estimation of inequality 
controlling for unemployment and immigration. Columns (3) and (4) add all other controls. 
Standard errors are given in parentheses below the coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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TABLE  4: POLICY IMPLICATIONS: EFFECTS OF REGRESSORS ON THE FR VOTE 
    PRR ER 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Initial FR vote 
share   4.44% 1.68% 
Policy variable 
(initially at the 
median) 
Inrease in 
variable 
Effect 
on  
levels 
v.s. after 
increase 
in 
variable 
% 
change 
in vote 
share 
Effect 
on  
levels 
 v.s. after 
increase 
in 
variable 
% 
change 
in  vote 
share 
Unemployment rate 50% 1.17% 5.61% 26% 0.41% 2.09% 24% 
Immigration flow 0.1% in flows 1.79% 6.23% 40% 0.76% 2.44% 45% 
Tax rate 50% 0% 4.44% 0% 0.85% 2.53% 51% 
Growth  50% 0% 4.44% 0% -0.13% 1.55% -8% 
Notes: We report the results of simulations concerning the effects of key socioeconomic/policy variables on PRR and ER 
vote shares. The calculations were based on our Tobit estimations of the PRR and ER votes. As a starting FR vote share we 
calculated the levels of FR support if all regressors assumed their median values. We then calculated the effect of a 50% 
increase in the median of each of our regressors (except Immigration) on the FR vote. Since the median for Immigration 
flows was effectively zero, we calculated the effect of a 0.1% increase in the Immigration flows, which corresponds to an 
increase from the median to the 65% highest percentile in Immigration flows. The results are presented in columns (1)-(6). 
The first column for each FR party category gives the absolute rise in PRR vote shares. The second column gives the FR 
vote share after the effect. The third column reports the % rise in FR vote shares as a result of a 50% rise in the 
determinant's median value. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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TABLE  5: ECOLOGICAL INFERENCE. HOW THE (UN)EMPLOYED VOTE 
  PRR ER 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
No covariate 
Covariate = 
Country 
dummy 
No covariate 
Covariate = 
Country 
dummy 
  mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
Bb (Unemployed) 0.011 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.009 0.001 0.004 0.000 
Bw (Employed) 0.084 0.000 0.084 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.028 0.000 
Note: This table presents the results of applying King's (1997) method of ecological 
inference of how the unemployed vote to our data. We report estimations from two 
models for each FR party category. Columns (1) and (3) apply the simple 2x2 method with 
no covariates and columns (2) and (4) add country dummies as covariate to control for 
possible differences in the way the unemployed vote between countries. For each model 
we report the mean FR vote for each group (unemployed/employed) and the standard 
deviation from our simulations. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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ONLINE APPENDIX FOR “MAPPING THE EUROPEAN FAR RIGHT IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY: A MESO-LEVEL ANALYSIS” 
 
 
A1. DETAILED PANEL SUMMARY STATISTICS, VARIABLE DESCRIPTION AND CODING 
 
A1.1 Data sources 
Unless otherwise stated, the data were obtained from the European Elections Database (EED, 
www.nsd.uib.no) on NUTS 2 level. Data on the French 2009 and 2014 European Elections and 2007 
and 2012 national elections (French Ministry of Interior), German 2009 European elections (General 
Elections Manager), Greek elections (Hellenic Ministry of Interior) and UK electoral data (electoral 
commission) were obtained at finer constituency levels and aggregated to NUTS 2 level. Data on 
the 2013 Italian parliamentary election were obtained from www.electionresources.org.12 
All socioeconomic data were taken from Eurostat. Exact definitions are given below 
 
 
A1.2 Variable definitions 
 
PRR and ER vote shares: Populist Radical Right and Extreme Right votes as a ratio of valid votes. 
Source: Electoral databases and Ministries of Interior as described in the main text. 
 
Unemployment rate: NUTS 2 regional long-term unemployment share in the total active population 
[Ifst_r_lfu2ltu]. Source: Eurostat. 
 
Immigration: % immigrant population. Numbers of immigrants were constructed as follows: using 
the 2011 Census from Eurostat (cens_11ctzo_r2), we obtained number of foreign citizens and 
employed regional (NUTS 2 level) rates of net migration plus statistical adjustment (CNMIGRAT) 
from Eurostat’s data on Population change and crude rates (demo_r_gind3) to estimate the growth 
rate of immigrant population and calculate forward (for years > 2011) and backwards (for 
years<2011) the number of immigrants: PQQ$R) = PQQ$(1 + T$) for years >2011 
And PQQ$ = UVVWXY()RZW)  for years <2011 
Where T$ denotes growth of immigrant population. Immigration rate was then calculated as #*UVV#Z\]^$_*#^*`abc*1*\dZ#e^`abc*1*fefgh]$#e^ . 
 
                                                   
12 Spain was not included in the sample, as regional vote shares for Spanish FR parties are not reported 
consistently for all regions, resulting in selection problems, which we cannot control as there is no 
information about the criteria for reporting.  
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Immigration flows: annual changes in Immigration. For example, if Immigration in year i is 5% and 
in year i + 1 is 4%, Immigration flow is −1%. Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
Income inequality: Gini coefficient of equalized disposable income (source: SILC- European Union 
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions) [ILC_DI12]. Source: Eurostat. 
 
GDP PPS per capita: GDP, Purchasing Power Standards per inhabitant. Source Eurostat 
(nama_10r_2gdp). 
 
Tax rate: Effective tax rate. 1 − k#_fe_]lhd*U^meVdn\#V]\o*U^meVd . Source: Authors’ calculation based on Disposable 
[BNG_U] and Primary [B2_3N_R] Income data from Eurostat [tgs00026]. 
 
Between regions inequality: Gini-coefficient for income differences between NUTS 3 sub-regional 
income within each NUTS 2 region. Source: Authors’ calculation, based on NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 
GDP per capita data from Eurostat. 
 
Wage share: ratio of wages [D1_R] over primary income [B2_3N_R]. Source: Eurostat [tgs00026]. 
 
Growth Dummy: Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the NUTS 2 region grew in the previous 
year and the value 0 otherwise. Source: authors’ calculations based on GDP PPS per inhabitant 
data as described above. 
 
Parliamentary election Dummy: Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the election was for national 
parliament and the value 0 if the election was for European parliament. 
 
Education: (Eurostat, regional educational statistics reg_educ_97). Population aged 25-64 by 
educational attainment level, sex and NUTS 2 regions (%)  (ed edat_lfse_04). Classification system:  
Lower 2ndary education: Less than primary, primary and lower secondary education: this 
aggregate refers to levels 0, 1 and 2 of the ISCED 2011 (online code ED0-2). Data up to 2013 
refer to ISCED 1997 levels 0, 1 and 2 but also include level 3C short (educational attainment 
from ISCED level 3 programs of less than two years). 
 
Tertiary education: this aggregate covers ISCED 2011 levels 5, 6, 7 and 8 (short-cycle tertiary 
education, bachelor's or equivalent level, master's or equivalent level, doctoral or 
equivalent level, online code ED5-8 ‘tertiary education’). Data up to 2013 refer to ISCED 
1997 levels 5 and 6. 
 
 
Table A1 reports detailed statistics of the dependent variables and regressors used in our analysis. 
We report detailed between and within variation of our panel. 
 
Table A2 reports the correlation matrix for our variables. 
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Table A3 gives a detailed list of all parties included in our analysis. Column 1 lists the country. 
Column 2 lists the parties’ names. Columns 3 and 4 list our classification of the parties as PRR or 
ER. As explained in our robustness section below, alternative classifications do not alter our 
results qualitatively in any way. Columns 5 and 6 give the year of national and European 
parliament elections for each country. Finally, column 7, reports the number of NUTS 2 regions for 
each country. 
 
A1.3 Software and coding. 
Figure 1 (FR vote map of Europe) and King’s (1997) ecological regression (both estimation and 
graphs) were made in R. All other estimations and graphs were made in STATA 14. Data and code 
are available for reproduction of our results at [insert link to Dataverse after finalizing 
tables/graphs]. 
 
 
A2. MODELLING CHOICES AND DIAGNOSTICS 
 
A2.1 Case classification 
We classified the 40 political parties under consideration between the two main variants that are largely 
recognized by the existing literature: PRR and ER parties. Both terms are used as generic (Eatwell, 1998, p. 
13). Although the criteria used by analysts of FR parties are not identical, they converge on the “primary 
distinction” (Minkenberg, 2013, p. 12) of the FR parties. As we explain in our paper, the dichotomy between 
ER and PRR is drawn according to their distance from historical fascism. The ER parties display elective 
affinities with historical fascism, whereas the PRR parties present themselves as “anti-system” and parties 
that challenge the establishment.  
Spatial, ideological and attitudinal factors are important for classifying parties of the FR in one of the two 
basic categories. We took into account parties located on the right edge of the L-R spectrum, classifying in 
the ER variant those with linkages to fascism (Hainsworth, 2008, p. 16) and openly opposing fundamental 
principles of the democratic state (Carter, 2005, p. 17), whilst in the PRR one, those with protest and anti-
system stances, expressing formal loyalty towards the democratic regime (Mudde, 2007, p. 31), whilst not 
being “totally hostile” (Eatwell, 1998, p. 3) to a “deviant” type of representative democracy (de Lange, 2008, 
p. 65). 
Whether ideological, discursive or organizational differences between Western and Eastern European FR are 
irrelevant (Blokker 2005), obsolete (Umland, 2015) or persistent (Minkenberg, 2013; 2017; Polyakova, 2015; 
Bustikova & Kitschelt, 2009), the party family, in its two basic variants, permeates the European continent. 
A set of existing analogies justifies comparing FR parties from both parts of the European continent 
(Mudde, 2007).  
Typologies cannot be unambiguous or exhaustive; ideal purity is an exception, whereas the norm is the 
plethora of borderline cases. Classifications in the FR party family could not escape this norm. As Norris 
(2005, p. 50) points out, “there is room to debate about borderline cases”. With all arguably marginal cases, 
such as some FR parties in Eastern Europe, we use alternative classifications for PRR and ER parties and 
repeat all our estimations in our robustness section. The results remain unaffected when we change the 
position of borderline ER cases and classify them as PRR. 
Parties that do not satisfy the basic criteria used for classification into the FR party family (nativism, 
populism, authoritarianism) (Mudde, 2007, p. 22) are not included in our analysis even though some of 
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them display strong parallels with FR parties. Some parties also change their profile during the time period 
under consideration. A typical example is UKIP: appearing at first as a “classic single-issue” Eurosceptic 
party, it progressively attracted the same socioeconomic strata that FR parties did (Ford & Goodwin, 2014, 
p. 3, 273). For these cases we test robustness as FR parties. 
 
A2.2 Model selection 
Consistent estimation of the FR vote in large comparative panels presents a number of 
methodological challenges. First note that since our data attempts an almost complete 
geographical coverage of Europe, it is reasonable to expect considerable heterogeneity between 
regions and/or countries. For these reason, use of panel estimators is imperative.  
However, as Jackman and Volpert (1996) have initially argued, FR right parties do not contest in 
all countries or regions. In regions where no FR parties contest, we observe a mass of zero values, 
which do not imply necessarily zero support for them. Jackman and Volpert (1996) first treated 
zero values as data censoring and used Tobit models to deal with it. This has set the standard in 
the literature since. The literature deals with both heterogeneity and zero values by introducing 
regional/country dummies in Tobit estimators. Introducing dummies in non-linear models 
however might subject estimation to the incidental parameters problem, particularly in panels 
with short time dimension. Inference suffers more by it in Tobit models (Greene 2004). 
To deal with the incidental parameters model without sacrificing our need for dealing with 
heterogeneity, we chose Honoré’s (1992) panel-Tobit estimator. This is based on differencing out 
fixed effects, is suitable even for panels with very short time dimension13 and works very well 
with unbalance panels such as ours. For these reasons this was our estimator of choice.  
To address the data censoring in our framework, we faced two other options: either traditional 
Tobit models with regional dummies to capture fixed effects or random effects Tobit models. We 
find that fixed effects Tobit models behave much better than random effects based on both 
graphical analysis and goodness-of-fit diagnostics. To see this, consider Figures A1 and A2, 
plotting fitted values against residuals and actual values for the PRR and ER estimations 
respectively. The estimation fitted for the three models is the main estimation testing hypotheses 1 
and 2 (corresponding to table 2, columns 1 and 2 in the main text). We report the estimated 
pseudo-R2 below the plots. For details about how we obtained pseudo-R2s, see section A2.3 
below). Both graphical inspection and the pseudo R2s obtained indicate that random effects Tobits 
perform rather poorly compared with our fixed effects estimators. For these reasons we repeated 
all estimation in the text with Tobit estimators using fixed effects rather than use random effect 
Tobit estimations. We only use a random effects estimator to estimate possible country effects in 
section 3.8.  
Note that Tobit estimation with regional dummies has the highest pseudo R2. We have preferred 
Honoré’s (1992) estimator nevertheless. This was done for three reasons: first, as argued above, 
our prime concern was with consistent estimation of the effects of our covariates, rather than 
prediction. Even though Tobit with regional dummies achieve higher apparent fitness, Honoré’s 
(1992) estimator suits better our dataset for consistent estimation. Secondly, the higher fitness of 
the Tobit model might be somewhat misleading. Tobits with regional dummies introduce a large 
number of dummies (229) in a short T panel (780 observations giving an average of 3.41 
observations per region), so the increased fit might be a sign of overfitting. Finally, even though 
                                                   
13 Honoré (1992) proves consistency of his estimator for T=2. 
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the Tobit estimator gives a higher pseudo R2 than Honoré (1992) for the uncensored sample,14 
when we include zero values Honoré (1992) has a higher correlation between fitted and actual 
values than Tobit with dummies. For these reasons Honoré’s (1992) was our estimator of choice, 
however we repeated all estimations using Tobit estimators with regional dummies without any 
qualitative differences, as is shown below. 
 
 
 
A2.3 Obtaining model fit 
As almost all the estimators we use are non-linear, R2 is not provided. Instead, following Dhrymes 
(1986) and Veall & Zimmermann (1994), we use a pseudo-R2 to approximate goodness of 
fit. This is calculated by the squared correlation between actual and fitted values of our 
dependent variable for uncensored p values: 
 *********************************************************q1 = [ stuu'*v*wx,W(p#,$, p#,$)*]1                                         (A1) 
 
 This is calculated for both Tobit models with dummies and random effects Tobit models 
as (p#) can be easily derived. For our models using Honoré’s (1992) estimator, however, 
fitted values cannot be obtained. To see why, note that since it “differences out” fixed 
effects, the fixed effects are controlled for, but are not estimated. Hence one cannot obtain 
the fitted value. Instead, the estimator minimizes a notion of distance between zp and zi ∙| (accounting for the possibility that p# might be zero). This makes direct calculation of p# 
implausible. To obtain a measure of fitness, we proceeded as follows: we multiplied the 
estimated parameters of the model & with zi to obtain an estimation of the fitted change in 
our dependent variable zp#,$. We then obtained an approximation of p# simply by adding 
the estimated change in our dependent variable to its lagged value: p#,$ = p#,$0) + zp#,$. We 
then proceed to estimate the the pseudo-q1 as described in equation (A1). 
 
 
A3. ROBUSTNESS OF OUR RESULTS TO ALTERNATIVE MODELING SPECIFICATIONS 
AND ESTIMATION METHODS OR INTERPRETATIONS 
 
We next present a series of regressions to ensure robustness of our results to alternative models 
and estimation methods.  
 
A3.1 Using a Tobit model with regional dummies 
Throughout our analysis, we used Honoré’s (1992) panel-Tobit estimator to control for regional 
fixed effects. We argued that the estimator is best suited for our unbalanced panel with small time 
to cross-sectional dimension ratio. This was chosen to avoid the incidental parameters problem 
that affects mostly the estimation of standard errors in Tobit models (Greene 2004), a problem that 
                                                   
14 In this we follow Veall & Zimmermann (1994). 
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is particularly pronounced in our case, since our cross-sectional dimension is very large compared 
to our time dimension. We check the robustness of our results using a standard Tobit estimator 
with regional dummies as is typically used in the literature. Since standard errors suffer in such 
cases, we used jackknife estimation of the standard errors in our Tobit models (Hahn and Newey 
2004). We used both a jackknife estimation excluding one year at a time, as suggested by Hahn and 
Newey (2004) and the much more computationally intensive jackknife estimation excluding one 
observation at a time. We report the results of the latter method in Tables A4-A6.15 Table A4 
presents the results of our estimations of Hypotheses 1 and 2. Results are qualitatively unchanged 
in our preferred specification with the exception of Immigration flow for ER parties which retains 
its positive sign but is now marginally not statistically significant (p-value=0.106). Table A5 
presents the results of the Tobit models testing Hypothesis 3. Results are qualitatively unchanged. 
In columns (1)-(4) immigration and the unemployment-immigration interaction retain their signs 
but lose significance. This could be attributed to two factors: a. the mutlicollinearity problem 
between immigration and the immigration-unemployment interaction and b. the fact that, due to 
the incidental parameters problem, Tobit estimations that include regional dummies produce 
biased estimations of standard errors. To check how the multicollinearity of immigration and the 
immigration-unemployment interaction might inflate standard errors, columns (5)-(8) include 
either immigration flows or immigration-unemployment interaction. We observe that when we 
remove one collinear regression statistical significance returns with the exception of column (7) for 
ER which is marginally not significant (p-value=0.106. Note that this is the same regression as in 
table A4 (4), commented above). Finally, Table A6 presents the results of our robustness estimation 
of Hypothesis 4. The signs of the coefficients of inequality on the PRR and the ER vote shares 
remain positive for Western European parties as before. The coefficient of income inequality for 
Western European ER parties is statistically significant at 1% level. For PRR parties, the coefficient 
is positive but no longer statistically significant. In Eastern Europe, the ER vote is negatively 
affected by increases in income inequality at 1% level. As before, no differences between Western 
and Eastern Europe are detected for PRR parties. 
 
A3.2 Controlling for immigration levels rather than changes 
In our estimations of hypotheses 1, 2 and 4, we used regional immigration flows. Tables A7 and A8 
in the Online Appendix, repeat our basic regressions, using immigration levels (% immigration 
over population). The effect of immigration on the FR vote retains its sign but now becomes 
statistically insignificant. For PRR parties it is clearly insignificant and for ER parties, it becomes 
marginally insignificant (p-value=0.132). Although the signs are not altered, the loss of 
significance might reflect the negative effects of the unemployment-immigration levels interaction 
discussed above. The signs of all statistically significant coefficients remain unaltered. In most 
cases coefficients are very close to the ones obtained in the regressions using immigration flows, 
indicating robustness of our results with respect to the measure of immigration. The effects of 
inequality on the PRR and ER vote remain qualitatively identical for Western European PRR and 
ER parties and for Eastern European ER parties. For Eastern European PRR parties, we now find 
that the effect of income inequality is now negative. 
 
 
                                                   
15 Results of estimations excluding one year at a time are available by the authors on request. 
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A3.3 Alternative classification of PRR and ER parties 
Our next robustness exercise involves alternative classification of parties as extreme or populist 
radical right. In particular the cases of Czech Republic’s DSSS, Latvia’s “All for Latvia”, Romania’s 
PRM and PNG-CD and Slovakia’s SNS were classified as extremist but could be argued to be of 
less extremity compared to the British National Party, Germany’s NPD, Greece’s Golden Dawn or 
Hungary’s Jobbik. We repeat all regressions classifying the above parties as PRR rather than ER. 
Tables A9-A11 of the Online Appendix correspond to tables A2-A4 of our main text with the 
alternative classification of parties. From tables A9 and A10 it is evident that our results 
concerning Hypotheses 1-3 remain robust to the alternative specification. With respect to the 
effects of income inequality, table A11 reports the results from our robustness estimations: the 
effect on Western European PRR parties remains positive and significant. The effect on Western 
European ER parties is still positive but no longer statistically significant. The effect on both 
Eastern European PRR and ER parties is now negative.  
 
A3.4 Differences between national and European parliament elections 
European parliament elections are often interpreted as “second order” elections in the sense that 
the political stakes involved are usually much lower than those in national parliament elections 
(Reif & Schmitt, 1980; van der Eijk et al., 1996; Schmitt, 2005). This might have important 
consequences upon a number of issues, such as turnout, or the voters’ incentives for a protest vote 
and support for populist and extremist parties. As such, it is not unreasonable to expect that voters 
might respond differently to socioeconomic indices when voting for members of the European 
parliament. Throughout our analysis we have invariably included a dummy for national 
parliament elections to capture shifts between the two different kinds of elections (national and 
European parliaments). In this section we control further for robustness of our results, checking 
the structural stability of our models with respect to national vs European parliament elections by 
extensively including interaction terms for all variables used in our regressions with our National 
parliament elections Dummies. In particular, we are interested in checking whether our results 
hold when we distinguish between the two kinds of elections. Tables A12-A14 repeat our main 
regressions (with all socio-economic controls used in the paper), including interactions between 
the national parliament election Dummy and all regressors. In all tables, we include all regressors 
used in the tables of the main text and only significant interactions between the regressors and the 
parliamentary elections Dummy. 
Table A12 checks robustness of our results concerning Hypotheses 1 and 2 when checking for 
structural stability between national and European parliament elections. Model (1) estimates the 
PRR vote and model (2) estimates the ER vote.  Columns (1a) and (2a) report coefficients for our 
base group (European elections). Columns (1b) and (2b) report coefficients for the interaction 
terms. With respect to unemployment, note that the effects on the far right vote remain 
qualitatively the same between European and national parliament elections. There is a statistically 
significant difference between European and national parliament elections. Unemployment has a 
stronger effect on the PRR vote in European elections (coefficient for European elections=3.189, 
coefficient for National elections=2.321 (=3.189-0.868)). However, for both kinds of elections, the 
effect of unemployment is positive, implying that our main results are not affected qualitatively 
when considering European rather than National elections.  
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The effect of unemployment on the ER vote, on the other hand, is more pronounced in national 
parliament elections (1.483=1.075+0.408) than in European elections (1.075).  Still, unemployment 
has a positive effect on both ER and PRR vote shares for both kinds of elections.  
The effect of immigration on the PRR vote remains positive and statistically significant for 
European parliament elections. Its effect on the ER vote is positive and marginally (p-value=0.134) 
insignificant for European parliament elections. Because immigration variable and the 
immigration-parliamentary elections dummy are highly collinear (>0.80), we cannot check for 
differences between parliamentary and European elections w.r.t. immigration flows. 
Note that there is some evidence of structural change between National and European elections, in 
particular with regard to the PRR vote. Specifically, in National elections, the PRR vote is 
negatively associated with the tax rate and growth and positively associated with between-regions 
inequality and the wage share. The European parliament PRR vote on the other hand is positively 
correlated with GDP and growth but is not associated with the other regressors. 
Table A13 checks robustness of our results concerning hypothesis 3 to distinction between 
European and National elections. The interaction of unemployment and immigration flow seems 
to affect PRR parties mostly through parliamentary elections. This is the only difference between 
European and National elections that we detected. For ER parties there is no qualitative difference 
between National and European elections (the effect of the interaction on the European elections 
ER vote shares is positive and marginally insignificant – p-value=.151). 
 
Table A14 checks the effect of income inequality on the far right vote accounting for differences 
between National and European elections. The effect of inequality on both the PRR and ER vote in 
European elections in Western countries is positive, and statistically significant. No difference 
between national and European parliament elections is observed for Western European countries. 
The effect of income inequality for Eastern European PRR parties remains positive as before (albeit 
of smaller magnitude in comparison to their Western European counterparts) and there is not 
difference detected between European and national elections. For ER parties, the effect of Income 
inequality in Eastern Europe is negative as before in both kinds of elections (with a slightly smaller 
coefficient for parliamentary elections). 
 
All in all, concerning our hypotheses, the only difference we detected between national and 
European parliament elections, regards the effect of the unemployment-immigration interaction 
on the PRR vote share (Table A13, column 1b). 
 
 
A3.5 Differences between Eastern and Western Europe 
We next examine how possible cleavages between Eastern and Western Europe might affect the 
results reached on hypotheses 1-4.  Tables A15-A17 report results from regressions testing 
hypotheses 1-4, including interaction terms between all of our regressors and a dummy indicating 
Eastern European countries. Note that no coefficient for an Eastern Europe dummy is not reported 
since we use a fixed effects estimator based on differences. Although our estimator controls for 
country regional fixed effects, these cannot be identified. Our tables report the significant 
interactions of our Eastern Europe Dummy with our regressors. 
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Table A15 confirms that our results on hypotheses 1-2 are robust when controlling for differences 
between Eastern and Western Europe. The interaction terms for unemployment/immigration and 
the Eastern Europe dummy are not statistically significant, implying that the effects of 
unemployment and immigration are uniform across the continent. The confirmation of hypotheses 
1 and 2 is robust when checking for structural stability between Eastern and Western Europe. 
 
From table A16, no difference between Eastern and Western Europe is detected for the ER vote 
(remember that for the PRR vote, the high collinearity between immigration flow and the 
unemployment/immigration interaction does not permit to draw inference about the significance 
of the interaction).  
 
Our results concerning the effect of inequality on PRR parties are robust to controlling for 
differences between Eastern and Western Europe: 
First, note that PRR parties in both continents are affected positively by inequality as expected as 
stated in hypothesis 4a. Its effect on the Eastern European ER vote is negative and statistically 
significant at 1% level (hypothesis 4b). The effect on the Western European ER vote is positive and 
statistically significant at 5% level. However, this might be due to the restriction of our sample 
when we use inequality data (see discussion below and at section A3.7). When we impute 
inequality data in section A3.7, the effect of inequality on PRR parties is always positive and the 
effect of inequality on ER parties in Western Europe is not statistically significant and negative and 
significant for Eastern Europe, as predicted by hypothesis 4a and b.  
Furthermore, even within the restricted (unimputed) sample, the effect of inequality on PRR 
parties is more pronounced than its effect on ER parties (partial effect on PRR parties = 0.23, 
partial effect on ER parties = 0.14)16. In Eastern Europe, the effect on PRR parties remains positive, 
but the effect on ER parties is negative and statistically significant. All in all the effect of inequality 
on PRR parties is positive and strong whereas its effect on ER is not significant/negative or 
weak(er) when positive, also in line with Hypothesis 4a, b. To ensure that the results of our 
inequality regressions are not affected by the sample restrictions, we re-estimate the effect of 
inequality, using imputed data for the whole sample. Our results are robust and presented in 
section A3.7. 
 
Controlling for differences between Eastern and Western Europe is of importance for yet another 
reason. Many or the parties classified as ER in our sample come from countries in Eastern Europe 
(Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia), so one cannot but wonder whether the 
differences we detect between PRR and ER parties might stem fundamentally from geographical 
rather than substantive differentiations. In particular, there might be reason for concern that ER is 
under-represented in Western Europe so the differences we observe between ER and PRR parties 
might reflect differences between the East and West caused by the fact that most of the variation in 
ER vote shares comes from the East whereas there is not enough variation in the ER vote in 
Western Europe. This however seems not to be the case in our sample for three reasons: 
First, if this was indeed the case, then we would expect that the two party categories would 
capture regional effects. So we would expect to notice a difference in their response to 
immigration that reflected different geographical responses to immigration, rather than different 
attitudes of the electorate. However, if this was the case, these differences should show within 
                                                   
16 Authors’ calculation from Tobit model with traditional dummies. 
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each party category when we controlled for regional effects. So, for example, if immigration 
affected the two party categories differently because most ER parties were concentrated in one 
region, then controlling for Western vs Eastern Europe effects within each party category, should 
produce significantly different results. This however, is not borne in our data as tables A15-A17 
make clear. 
 
Secondly, if the two categories do not differ in any other way, other than geographical positioning, 
then the two categories should not differ within the same region. So for example if the differences 
were driven purely by geographical differences, then within the same region, PRR and ER should 
not differ. We test whether this is the case by running our baseline regression for each party 
category, within the same region (Western Europe). Table A18 reports the results of these 
estimations. Model 1 repeats the estimation of table 1, columns (1) and (2): it is our baseline model 
for the whole sample. Model 2 restricts the estimation to Western Europe only. The two party 
families still differ with respect to the tax rate, between regions inequality, the wage share, growth 
rates and Parliamentary elections dummy. They also differ when we restrict the sample to Eastern 
Europe with respect to the same variables, although results might vary quantitatively (for example 
now the coefficient tax rate for PRR parties becomes statistically significant and retains its negative 
sign). In sum, even when we restrict the sample to either Western or Easter Europe, the two party 
families exhibit substantial differences. 
Finally, this would be a concern if ER was indeed under-represented in one of the two regions. 
Table A19 presents detailed panel summary statistics for ER and our main covariates for Western 
and Eastern Europe separately. Note that ER parties are adequately represented in both regions. 
For Western Europe ER parties receive positive vote shares in 51% of the sample (289 out of 562 
time-regions), whereas for Eastern Europe in 44% of the sample (97 out of 218 time-regions). Other 
covariates display similar variation between the two regions as well. 
 
 
 
A3.6 Using GDP growth instead of an index for expansion/contraction 
We next substitute the Dummy for growth used in our main text the actual growth levels for our 
NUTS 2 regions. None of our results changes qualitatively from this. Tables A20-A22 present the 
results of our main regressions substituting growth rates in the place of the growth dummy. 
 
A3.7 Using imputed income inequality data for missing values 
Inequality data are scarce and have not been collected by Eurostat for the entire span of our 
sample. For example, inequality is missing for Germany between 2003 and 2005, resulting in 
excluding the 2004 European and the 2005 national parliament elections and reducing the sample 
for Germany by half. Table A23 lists the observations used by country for the regressions testing 
hypotheses 1-4 and the sample reduction per country when including income inequality. To 
ensure that our testing of Hypothesis 4 is not affected by this sample restriction, we re-estimate 
Table 4 for the whole sample. We imputed missing values for each region by their last known 
value. Table A24 presents the results of our robustness regression for the effect of inequality on the 
FR vote with imputed data. Our results remain qualitatively identical. Finally, Table A25 re-
estimates our Eastern vs Western Europe robustness exercise with the imputed sample. The effect 
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of inequality on PRR remains positive but is now insignificant. The effect of inequality on ER is 
qualitatively identical to Table A17. 
 
A3.8 Controlling for possible country effects 
In all our estimations we control for regional effects by extensive use of fixed effects estimators. 
However, there might be significant country effects, that is effects that are common for all regions 
in a country. 
Firstly, regions in the same countries might behave similarly or be subject to common historical, 
sociological, political or other effects. These might be correlated with our explanatory variables. 
Since we use regional fixed effects estimator, this is not a concern about consistent estimation of 
our variables of interest, because country-level fixed effects are fully controlled for when we use 
region-level fixed effects (note that country fixed effects are a special case of regional fixed effects 
in which C#=C} for i,j in the same country. So we control for country effects to ensure that 
estimation of our parameters of interest is not affected by them). However, our fixed effects 
estimator cannot estimate country fixed-effects as these are perfectly collinear with the regional 
fixed effects (which can also not be estimated in the case of estimators based on differences such as 
Honoré 1992).  
To estimate country fixed effects, we use a random effects Tobit estimator and added country 
dummies. Table A26 reports the results of our regressions. Columns (1) and (3) present the results 
of a random effects model of our main regression for the PRR and ER vote respectively without 
country effects. Columns (2) and (4) add country effects. All results are qualitatively unchanged 
and in line with our findings reported in the tables in the main text. The effect of changes in 
immigration on the ER vote retains its sign but now becomes marginally not significant (p-value = 
0.122). Country effects are reported below our main regressors. 
The second channel through which country effects might affect our inference is through possible 
clustered standard errors. Specifically, it is possible that standard errors might be correlated 
between countries. Honoré’s (1992) estimator does not admit clustering of standard errors. 
Furthermore, clustering standard errors in traditional Tobits with dummies, at either regional or 
country level, produces variance-covariance matrices that are not full rank in our case). To address 
the concern of correlated disturbances at the county level and gain insight of how clustering our 
standard errors at country level might affect our inference, we use linear OLS fixed effects 
estimators and compare clustering of standard errors at regional level with clustering at country 
level. Table A27 reports the results of our estimations. Note that, as expected, clustering at country 
level, increases the estimated variance and reduces significance. However, with respect to our key 
variables of interest (unemployment, immigration), note that unemployment remains significant 
at 5% level in the case of PRR and 10% level in the case of ER, whereas immigration becomes only 
marginally insignificant (p-value=0.149) for PRR. For ER immigration is significant at 1% level. 
Here, we have to bear in mind that this clustering standard errors at country level does not 
necessarily produce consistent estimations as the number of clusters is rather small (28) whereas 
for consistent estimation the number of clusters should go to infinity (Cameron and Miller 2015). 
Still, the results suggest that whereas clustering at country level might increase standard errors, 
the coefficients of our key variables of interest remain by and large significant. 
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A3.9 Controlling for education 
Individual-level studies (for example Arzheimer, 2009) that focus on the importance of socio-
structural characteristics in explaining electoral support for the FR parties find a strong effect of 
education on the FR vote. Studies that control for variations among different countries found that 
the effect of education remains significant (e.g. Lubbers et al, 2002). Could the level of education at 
a regional level have an effect on the European FR vote? To explore this possibility, we include as 
regressors two measures of educational attainment: the percentage of the population with tertiary 
education (capturing the proportion of population with high education – levels 5-8 in Eurostat’s 
database) and the percentage of population with lower education (levels 0-4). Table A28 reports 
the results of our estimations. Education is not found statistically significant in this or any other 
specification we tried. 
 
A3.10 Investigating further the effect of GDP per capita 
In the vast majority of specifications we tried, GDP per capita has a positive and very significant 
effect on the PRR and ER vote. To get a better insight on how GDP might affect the FR vote, table 
A29 reports the results from two models further enquiring about the channels through which GDP 
might affect the FR vote. In particular, Model 1 investigates possible interactions between GDP 
and unemployment. 
 
For PRR parties, the coefficient for the interaction term between unemployment and GDP is 
negative, implying that as unemployment rises, the effect of GDP on PRR falls. The effect of the 
interaction term on the ER vote is not statistically significant, implying that unemployment and 
GDP affect the ER vote independently of one another.  
 
[Figure A3 here] 
 
Figure A3 plots the partial effects of unemployment and GDP, controlling for their interaction. The 
effects of GDP depend heavily on the levels of unemployment in the case of PRR. They are 
positive for low unemployment levels and reduce as unemployment rises. For levels of 
unemployment above about 15%, the partial effects of GDP per capita become negative and 
statistically significant, implying that for areas with high unemployment levels, reductions of GDP 
further increase the PRR vote. This implies that poverty per se is not sufficient to increase the FR 
vote shares. However, when combined with high unemployment, poverty can become a driving 
force for radical right voting. The negative interaction of unemployment and GDP is evident in the 
upper left plot, depicting the partial effects of unemployment on PRR. Although higher levels of 
GDP reduce the effects of unemployment, the latter has always a positive effect on the PRR vote, 
albeit it loses significance for higher levels of GDP.  
Regarding the effect of the interaction on the ER vote, this was found not significant. Indeed, both 
unemployment and GDP affect the ER vote positively and significantly, irrespective of one 
another’s levels. 
Model 2 breaks GDP into quartiles and adds a dummy indicating which quartile of the overall 
GDP distribution the region’s GDP belongs to. This semi-parametric way of assessing the effect of 
GDP allows to examine how the effects change along the GDP distribution. The lower 25% GDP 
quartile is taken as base. The results are telling: for PRR parties, the three lower quartiles of GDP 
have a similar voting behavior towards PRR parties. The highest 25% thought votes significantly 
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more for PRR parties. So we can deduce that the PRR vote is significantly higher in the richest 25% 
regions. For ER parties, the vote shares rise gradually as GDP increases. Going up the quartiles of 
the GDP distribution increases the ER vote between 2.9 and 4.4% (based on the latent relation 
between GDP and ER as measured by our panel Tobit coefficients). 
 
A3.11 Ecological inference: how do the (un)employed vote? 
In our robustness section, we presented the results from King’s (1997) ecological inference method 
concerning unemployment and the FR vote. There we showed that despite the positive 
relationship between unemployment and FR (both PRR and ER) vote shares, ecological inference 
suggests that the unemployed vote less for the FR than the employed. Figure A4 supplements the 
analysis with a scatterplot of the FR vote against unemployment. The yellow line plots the 
estimated conditional expectation of the FR vote given the level of unemployment by King’s (1997) 
ecological inference. The red lines give 80% confidence intervals. The green lines fitted in the 
scatterplots correspond to Goodman’s (1953) ecological regression. Note that these results, 
although interesting, should be taken with a grain of salt: King’s (1997) ecological inference is 
based on rather restricting common distributional assumptions between constituencies which 
might be rather demanding in the case of NUTS 2 regions.  
 
[Figure A4 here] 
 
A3.12 Voting rights for immigrants 
This section tests robustness of our results when we exclude countries that give immigrants partial 
voting rights. This reduces our sample considerably: Specifically, we exclude all European 
elections in which EU citizens are allowed to vote in their country of residence. We also exclude 
Ireland, Portugal and the U.K. which extend partial voting rights to immigrants in national 
elections. Table A30 reports the results of our robustness exercise. All our results remain 
qualitatively unchanged and all our coefficients retain their signs. With respect to PRR parties, the 
effect of the interaction of unemployment and immigration now becomes significant as does the 
effect of tax rate. The effect of the interaction between unemployment and immigration on the ER 
vote retains its positive value but is now not statistically significant and the effect of GDP also 
retains its sign but becomes statistically insignificant. All our main conclusions hold. In fact, our 
finding that ER parties respond predominantly to economic insecurity and less to cultural 
backlash whereas PRR parties respond to cultural backlash and only to unemployment from all 
indices of economic insecurity is now strengthened.  
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 FIGURE A1: FITTED VS ACTUAL VALUES AND RESIDUAL FOR THREE 
DIFFERENT TOBIT ESTIMATORS: PRR 
 Fitted values vs residual scatterplot Actual vs fitted values scatterplot 
 
  
Pseudo R2 = 0.541 
 
  
 Pseudo R2 = 0.752 
 
  
 Pseudo R2 = 0.020 
Notes: The graph plots the fitted values against residuals (left column) and fitted against actual 
values (right column) for the estimation of the PRR vote with three different Tobit estimators: 
Honoré (1992), Tobit with regional dummies and rando effects Tobit. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on European electoral data and Eurostat socioeconomic data. 
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FIGURE A2: FITTED VS ACTUAL VALUES AND RESIDUAL FOR THREE 
DIFFERENT TOBIT ESTIMATORS: ER 
 Fitted values vs residual scatterplot Actual vs fitted values scatterplot 
 
  
Pseudo R2 = 0.418 
 
  
Pseudo R2 = 0.635 
 
  
Pseudo R2 = 0.050 
Notes: The graph plots the fitted values against residuals (left column) and fitted against actual 
values (right column) for the estimation of the ER vote with three different Tobit estimators: 
Honoré (1992), Tobit with regional dummies and rando effects Tobit. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on European electoral data and Eurostat socioeconomic data. 
-.1
0
.1
.2
Re
sid
ua
ls
-.2 0 .2 .4
Fitted ER vote
Panel-tobit (Honoré 1992)
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
Ac
tu
al 
ER
 vo
te
-.2 0 .2 .4
Fitted ER vote
Panel-tobit (Honoré 1992)
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
Re
sid
ua
ls
-.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1
Fitted ER vote
Tobit with fixed effects (regional dummies)
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
Ac
tu
al 
ER
 vo
te
-.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1
Fitted ER vote
Tobit with fixed effects (regional dummies)
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
Re
sid
ua
ls
-.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1
Fitted ER vote
Tobit with random effects
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
Ac
tu
al 
ER
 vo
te
-.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1
Fitted ER vote
Tobit with random effects
H
on
or
é 
(1
99
2)
 
To
bi
t w
ith
 re
gi
on
al
 d
um
m
ie
s 
 
R
an
do
m
 e
ff
ec
ts
 T
ob
it 
 
 56 
 
FIGURE A3: PARTIAL EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION 
 Partial effects of GDP Partial effects of Unemployment 
PRR 
  
ER 
  
Notes: The graph plots the marginal effects of unemployment (left) and immigration (right) for 
PRR (up) and ER (bottom) parties controlling for unemployment-GDP interaction.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on European electoral data and Eurostat socioeconomic data. 
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FIGURE A4: SCATTERPLOT OF FR AGAINST UNEMPLOYMENT WITH 
ECOLOGICAL REGRESSION LINES 
 
 Scatterplot with E(PRR|unemployment), 80% C. I. and Goodman 
Scatterplot with E(ER|unemployment), 80% 
C. I. and Goodman 
 
  
 Unemployment Unemployment 
   
Notes: Scatteplots of PRR (left) and ER (right) vote shares against unemployment. The yellow line 
is the expected PRR (ER) based on King’s (1997) ecological inference.  The red lines give 80% 
confidence intervals. The green line is Goodman’s ecological regression line. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on European electoral data and Eurostat socioeconomic data. 
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TABLE A1: PANEL SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
       
FR vote share overall 0.078 0.091 0 0.542 N =    1170 
 between  0.076 0 0.427 n =     265 
 within  0.055 -0.104 0.301 T = 4.415 
PRR vote share overall 0.063 0.092 0 0.542 N =    1170 
 between  0.082 0 0.427 n =     265 
 within  0.047 -0.119 0.286 T = 4.415 
ER vote share overall 0.015 0.035 0 0.255 N =    1170 
 between  0.023 0 0.112 n =     265 
 within  0.024 -0.084 0.179 T = 4.415 
Unemployment rate overall 0.040 0.036 0.003 0.208 N =     958 
 between  0.030 0.005 0.169 n =     251 
 within  0.018 -0.028 0.156 T = 3.817 
%Immigrationt-1 overall 0.038 0.040 0 0.392 N =    1036 
 between  0.042 0 0.350 n =     261 
 within  0.008 -0.018 0.110 T = 3.969 
Δ (%Immigrationt-1) overall 0.001 0.004 -0.075 0.047 N =     995 
 between  0.003 -0.008 0.024 n =     261 
 within  0.003 -0.079 0.043 T = 3.812 
Income inequality overall 0.293 0.034 0.220 0.378 N =     969 
 between  0.031 0.231 0.368 n =     265 
 within  0.015 0.242 0.341 T =  3.657 
GDP PPS per capita overall 21.767 8.743 4.500 85.900 N =    1016 
 between  8.821 6.220 79.333 n =     256 
 within  2.111 9.333 33.667 T = 3.969 
Tax rate overall 0.101 0.098 -0.340 0.354 N =     981 
 between  0.094 -0.180 0.333 n =     247 
 within  0.021 -0.059 0.245 T = 3.972 
Between regions  overall 0.078 0.066 0 0.315 N =    1020 
     inequality between  0.066 0 0.312 n =     257 
 within  0.008 0.036 0.124 T = 3.969 
Wage share overall 0.715 0.098 0.394 0.950 N =     984 
 between  0.102 0.422 0.931 n =     248 
 within  0.019 0.627 0.776 T = 3.968 
Growth Dummy overall 0.762 0.426 0 1 N =    1169 
 between  0.212 0.200 1 n =     264 
 within  0.374 -0.095 1.562 T = 4.428 
Parliamentary election  overall 0.673 0.469 0 1 N =    1170 
     Dummy between  0.197 0.333 1 n =     265 
 within  0.430 -0.127 1.339 T = 4.415 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data.   
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TABLE A2: VARIABLES' CORRELATION MATRIX 
 FR PRR ER  Un. 
Rate 
%Imm Un x 
(%Imm) 
Δ 
(%Imm) 
Un x 
Δ(%Imm) 
Ineq. GDP 
p. h. 
Tax B.R.I
. 
W. S. Growth 
Dummy 
Parl. El. 
Dummy 
FR vote share 1               
PRR vote share 0.90 1              
ER vote share 0.20 -0.24 1             
Unemployment rate -0.03 -0.11 0.19 1            
%Immigrationt-1 0.03 0.11 -0.17 -0.25 1           
%Immigrationt-1 x Unemployment 0.01 0.06 -0.11 0.20 0.77 1          
Δ (%Immigrationt-1)(x100) 0.06 0.02 0.10 0.12 -0.46 -0.35 1         
Δ (%Immigrationt-1)(x100)xUnemp. 0.06 0.00 0.14 0.06 -0.37 -0.41 0.84 1        
Income inequality -0.12 -0.19 0.16 0.13 -0.07 0.00 -0.04 0.00 1       
GDP PPS per capita (/1000) 0.12 0.23 -0.25 -0.38 0.63 0.44 -0.41 -0.38 -0.20 1      
Tax rate 0.18 0.28 -0.23 -0.50 0.36 0.11 -0.21 -0.18 -0.51 0.65 1     
Between regions inequality -0.07 -0.08 0.03 0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.16 -0.14 0.19 0.03 -0.03 1    
Wage share 0.12 0.11 0.00 -0.42 0.18 -0.01 -0.23 -0.21 -0.37 0.31 0.51 -0.03 1   
Growth Dummy -0.08 -0.03 -0.11 0.20 -0.21 -0.08 0.14 0.04 0.02 -0.18 -0.10 0.10 -0.28 1  
Parliamentary election Dummy -0.12 -0.05 -0.14 0.21 -0.03 0.07 0.15 0.11 0.02 -0.07 -0.16 0.05 -0.24 0.28 1 
 60 
TABLE A3: LIST AND CATEGORIZATION OF F. R. PARTIES 
Country Party Classification Electoral years  Number 
of regions 
  PRR ER National Parliament European 
Parlament 
 
Austria FPO √  2002, 2006, 2008 2004, 2009 9 
 BZO √     
Belgium VB √  2003, 2007, 2010 2004, 2009 11 
 FNb √     
 N-VA √     
Bulgaria ATTAKA √  2005, 2009 2007, 2009 3 
Croatia HSP √  2000, 2003, 2007, 2011 4 
Cyprus ELAM  √  2006,  2011 2004, 2009 1 
Czech Rep. DSSS  √ 2006, 2010 2004, 2009 8 
 RMS √     
Denmark DF √  2007, 2011 2009 5 
Estonia EIP √  2003, 2007, 2011  1 
Finland PERUS √  2003, 2007, 2011 2004 4 
France FN √  2002, 2007, 2012 2004, 2009, 2014 26 
Germany  NPD  √ 2002, 2005, 2009 2004, 2009 38 
 DVU  √    
 REP √     
Greece LAOS √  2004, 2007, 2009, 2012 2004, 2009, 2014 13 
 GD  √    
 ANEL √     
Hungary JOBBIK  √ 2002, 2006, 2010 2004, 2009 7 
Ireland    2002, 2007, 2011 2004, 2009 2 
Italy LN √  2001, 2006, 2008 2009, 2014 20 
 F-T  √    
Latvia VL  √ 2006, 2010, 2011 2009 1 
 NA √     
Lithuania    2002, 2004, 2008, 2012 2004, 2009 1 
Luxembourg   2004, 2009 2004, 2009 1 
Netherlands PVV √  2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2011 2004, 2009 12 
 LPF √  2001, 2005, 2009   
Norway FRP √  2001, 2005, 2009  7 
Poland LPR √  2001, 2005, 2007  16 
 SRP √     
 KNP √     
Portugal PNR √  2002, 2005, 2009, 2011 7 
Romania PRM  √ 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 2007, 2009 8 
 PNG-CD √    
Slovakia SNS  √ 2002, 2006, 2010, 2012 2004, 2009 4 
Slovenia SNS √  2000, 2004, 2008, 2011 2004, 2009 2 
Sweden SD √  2010 2009 8 
Switzerland SVP √  2003, 2007, 2011  7 
UK NBP  √ 2005, 2010 2009, 2014 37 
 NF  √    
TOTAL      266 
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TABLE A4: ROBUSTNESS-HYPOTHESES 1 AND 2 USING TOBIT WITH 
REGIONAL DUMMIES 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
 Unemployment-
immigration 
Unemployment-
immigration + Ec. 
Covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable PRR ER PRR ER 
     
Unemployment ratet-1 1.599*** 0.696*** 1.801*** 0.825*** 
 (0.246) (0.225) (0.269) (0.185) 
Δ (%Immigrationt-1) 0.320 0.100 0.569** 0.164 
 (0.255) (0.107) (0.289) (0.101) 
GDP PPS per    0.006*** 0.004*** 
   capitat-1 (x 103)   (0.002) (0.001) 
Tax ratet-1   -0.261 0.443*** 
   (0.203) (0.106) 
Between regions   -0.780* -0.010 
    inequalityt-1   (0.437) (0.378) 
Wage sharet-1   -0.101 0.513*** 
   (0.199) (0.122) 
Growth Dummyt-1   -0.006 -0.039*** 
   (0.008) (0.009) 
Parliamentary  -0.005 -0.008 -0.004 -0.003 
     election Dummyt-1 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Constant 0.112*** -0.212*** 0.186 -0.687*** 
 (0.041) (0.019) (0.156) (0.127) 
     
Observations 842 842 780 780 
Censored 294 450 274 394 
Uncensored 548 392 506 386 
Number of clusters 248 248 229 229 
Region FE yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo R2 0.772 0.494 0.752 0.635 
Notes: this table reports the results of Tobit estimations of the European extreme right 
(ER) and populist radical right (PRR) vote shares 2000-2014 that test Hypotheses 1-2, 
using regional dummies and corresponds to Table 2 in the main text. Columns (1) and (2) 
report the estimation of the basic model testing hypotheses 1 and 2. Columns (3) and (4) 
add economic controls. Jackknife standard errors are given in parentheses below the 
coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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TABLE  A5: ROBUSTNESS-HYPOTHESIS 3: UNEMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION INTERACTION. TOBIT 
WITH REGIONAL DUMMIES 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3   
 Immigration rates Changes in 
immigration rates 
Changes in immigration rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable PRR  ER  PRR  ER  PRR  ER  
         
Unemployment 
ratet-1 
1.719*** 0.654** 1.771*** 0.780*** 1.801*** 1.765*** 0.825*** 0.781*** 
 (0.309) (0.258) (0.273) (0.196) (0.269) (0.274) (0.185) (0.190) 
%Immigrationt-1 1.182 7.679       
 (5.210) (7.388)       
%Immigrationt-1 -18.442 -9.134       
   x Unemploymentt-1 (11.266) (8.276)       
Δ (%Immigrationt-1)   0.210 -0.006 0.569**  0.164  
   (0.451) (0.195) (0.289)  (0.101)  
Δ (%Immigrationt-1)   11.663 5.114  16.634**  4.991* 
   x Unemploymentt-1   (9.703) (5.174)  (6.624)  (2.752) 
GDP PPS per  0.004** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
   capitat-1 (x 103) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tax ratet-1 -0.239 0.364*** -0.214 0.446*** -0.261 -0.188 0.443*** 0.446*** 
 (0.204) (0.115) (0.208) (0.106) (0.203) (0.198) (0.106) (0.106) 
Between regions -0.911** -0.088 -0.791* -0.014 -0.780* -0.802* -0.010 -0.013 
    inequalityt-1 (0.447) (0.365) (0.438) (0.379) (0.437) (0.436) (0.378) (0.376) 
Wage sharet-1 0.166 0.645*** -0.090 0.514*** -0.101 -0.076 0.513*** 0.514*** 
 (0.207) (0.121) (0.200) (0.123) (0.199) (0.196) (0.122) (0.123) 
Growth Dummyt-1 -0.007 -0.040*** -0.005 -0.037*** -0.006 -0.005 -0.039*** -0.037*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Parliamentary  -0.000 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
     election Dummyt-1 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 0.016 -1.117*** 0.174 -0.687*** 0.186 0.164 -0.687*** -0.687*** 
 (0.322) (0.358) (0.157) (0.128) (0.156) (0.154) (0.127) (0.128) 
         
Observations 812 812 780 780 780  780  
Censored 283 426 274 394 274  394  
Uncensored 529 386 506 386 506  386  
Number of clusters 229 229 229 229 229  229  
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes  yes  
Pseudo R2 0.716 0.622 0.752 0.637 0.752 0.751 0.635 0.637 
Notes: this table reports the results of robustness Tobit estimations of the European extreme right (ER) and populist radical right (PRR) 
vote shares 2000-2014, testing for unemployment-immigration interactions with regional dummies. The table corresponds to Table 3 in the 
main text. Columns (1) and (2) report the estimation, measuring immigration rates (immigrants to natives ratio). Columns (3) and (4) use 
changes in immigration rates. Jackknife standard errors are given in parentheses below the coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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TABLE A6: ROBUSTNESS-HYPOTHESIS 4 - EFFECT OF INCOME 
INEQUALITY. TOBIT WITH REGIONAL DUMMIES 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
 Basic Model Economic regressors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable PRR  ER  PRR  ER  
     
Income inequalityt-1 0.499*** -0.168 0.366* -0.519* 
 (0.135) (0.202) (0.220) (0.287) 
Unemployment ratet-1 1.050*** 1.217*** 1.104*** 1.194*** 
 (0.295) (0.275) (0.292) (0.247) 
Δ (%Immigrationt-1) 0.474 0.072 0.749** 0.005 
 (0.466) (0.168) (0.361) (0.168) 
GDP PPS per capitat-1   0.005** 0.006** 
   (0.002) (0.003) 
Tax ratet-1   -0.274 0.481*** 
   (0.234) (0.116) 
Between regions   -1.072** -0.079 
    inequalityt-1   (0.482) (0.443) 
Wage sharet-1   0.182 0.499*** 
   (0.226) (0.135) 
Growth Dummyt-1   0.006 -0.041*** 
   (0.009) (0.012) 
Parliamentary election  0.001 -0.027*** 0.001 -0.011 
   Dummyt (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Constant -0.018 -0.175*** -0.057 -0.600*** 
 (0.056) (0.062) (0.183) (0.140) 
     
Observations 705 705 656 656 
Censored 253 396 233 353 
Uncensored 452 309 423 303 
Number of clusters 248 248 229 229 
Region FE yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo R2 0.797 0.569 0.802 0.680 
Notes: this table reports the results of robustness Tobit estimations of the European 
extreme right (ER) and populist radical right (PRR) vote shares 2000-2014, testing for 
the effect of income inequality with regional dummies, and correspond to Table 4 in the 
main text. Columns (1) and (2) report the estimation of inequality controlling for 
unemployment and immigration. Columns (3) and (4) add all other controls. Standard 
errors are given in parentheses below the coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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TABLE A7: ROBUSTNESS-HYPOTHESES 1 AND 2: IMMIGRATION 
LEVELS 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
 Unemployment-
immigration 
Unemployment-
immigration + Ec. 
Covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable PRR ER PRR ER 
     
Unemployment ratet-1 2.032*** 0.985** 2.354*** 1.079*** 
 (0.227) (0.477) (0.277) (0.343) 
%Immigrationt-1 2.227*** 26.264 4.647 15.040 
 (0.398) (16.560) (5.120) (9.975) 
GDP PPS per    0.006** 0.006** 
   capitat-1 (x 103)   (0.002) (0.002) 
Tax ratet-1   0.070 0.631*** 
   (0.221) (0.126) 
Between regions   -0.798 -0.595 
    inequalityt-1   (0.516) (0.468) 
Wage sharet-1   0.371 0.679*** 
   (0.284) (0.146) 
Growth Dummyt-1   0.001 -0.077*** 
   (0.007) (0.018) 
Parliamentary  0.000 -0.015*** 0.001 -0.006* 
     election Dummyt-1 (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
     
Observations 875 875 812 812 
Censored 303 483 283 426 
Uncensored 572 392 529 386 
Number of clusters 248 248 229 229 
Region FE yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo R2 0.611 0.416 0.546 0.402 
Joint-significance Wald χ2 80.53 10.62 99.66 51.52 
Notes: this table reports the results of robustness panel Tobit estimations after Honoré 
(1992) of the European extreme right (ER) and populist radical right (PRR) vote shares 
2000-2014 with immigration levels instead of flows. Columns (1) and (2) report the 
estimation of the basic model testing hypotheses 1 and 2 and correspond to Table 2 in the 
main text. Columns (3) and (4) add economic controls. Standard errors are given in 
parentheses below the coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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TABLE A8: ROBUSTNESS-HYPOTHESIS 4:  EFFECT OF INCOME 
INEQUALITY WITH IMMIGRATION LEVELS 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
 Basic Model Economic regressors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable PRR  ER  PRR  ER  
     
Income inequalityt-1 0.534*** -0.356 0.591** -0.663** 
 (0.188) (0.239) (0.277) (0.318) 
Unemployment ratet-1 2.036*** 1.771*** 2.245*** 1.450*** 
 (0.231) (0.632) (0.303) (0.388) 
%Immigrationt-1 2.674*** 145.345** 4.886 110.557*** 
 (0.355) (69.953) (5.402) (29.560) 
GDP PPS per capitat-1   0.003 0.006 
   (0.003) (0.005) 
Tax ratet-1   0.279 0.535*** 
   (0.261) (0.123) 
Between regions   -0.978* -0.885** 
    inequalityt-1   (0.585) (0.429) 
Wage sharet-1   0.502 0.694*** 
   (0.347) (0.132) 
Growth Dummyt-1   0.008 -0.064*** 
   (0.010) (0.017) 
Parliamentary election  0.007 -0.027*** 0.007 -0.014** 
   Dummyt (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
     
Observations 737 737 688 688 
Censored 262 428 242 385 
Uncensored 475 309 446 303 
Number of clusters 248 248 229 229 
Region FE yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo R2 0.589 0.288 0.560 0.351 
Joint-significance Wald χ2 85.75 102.86 101.53 153.43 
Notes: this table reports the results of robustness panel Tobit estimations after Honoré 
(1992) of the European extreme right (ER) and populist radical right (PRR) vote shares 
2000-2014, testing for the effect of income inequality and controlling for regional 
immigration levels rather than flows and corresponds to Table 4 in the main text. 
Columns (1) and (2) report the estimation of inequality controlling for unemployment 
and immigration. Columns (3) and (4) add all other controls. Standard errors are 
given in parentheses below the coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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TABLE A9: ROBUSTNESS-HYPOTHESES 1 AND 2 UNDER 
ALTERNATIVE PARTY CLASSIFICATION 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
 Unemployment-
immigration 
Unemployment-
immigration + Ec. 
Covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable PRR ER PRR ER 
     
Unemployment ratet-1 1.869*** 2.007 2.233*** 1.433*** 
 (0.226) (1.693) (0.314) (0.340) 
Δ (%Immigrationt-1) 0.469** 0.286*** 0.611* 0.507*** 
 (0.232) (0.104) (0.337) (0.109) 
GDP PPS per    0.006*** 0.018*** 
    capitat-1 (x 103)   (0.002) (0.003) 
Tax ratet-1   0.172 0.791*** 
   (0.141) (0.251) 
Between regions   -0.857** -0.000 
    inequalityt-1   (0.425) (0.795) 
Wage sharet-1   0.257 1.165*** 
   (0.166) (0.140) 
Growth Dummyt-1   0.002 -0.090*** 
   (0.006) (0.023) 
Parliamentary  -0.001 -0.027*** 0.001 -0.009* 
     election Dummyt-1 (0.003) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) 
     
Observations 842 842 780 780 
Censored 224 522 204 466 
Uncensored 618 320 576 314 
Number of clusters 248 248 229 229 
Region FE yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo R2 0.607 0.366 0.540 0.318 
Joint-significance Wald χ2 76.49 19.58 64.87 178.29 
Notes: this table reports the results of robustness panel Tobit estimations after Honoré 
(1992) of the European extreme right (ER) and populist radical right (PRR) vote shares 
2000-2014. We check robustness with regards to alternative party classification: Parties 
identified as marginal ER in section A2.4 are now classified as PRR.  The table 
corresponds to Table 2 in our main text. Columns (1) and (2) report the estimation of the 
basic model testing hypotheses 1 and 2. Columns (3) and (4) add economic controls. 
Standard errors are given in parentheses below the coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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TABLE  A10: ROBUSTNESS-HYPOTHESIS 3:  UNEMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION INTERACTION WITH 
ALTERNATIVE PARTY CLASSIFICATION 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 
 Immigration rates Changes in immigration 
rates 
Changes in immigration rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable PRR ER PRR ER PRR  ER  
         
Unemployment ratet-1 2.234*** 0.821** 2.221*** 1.385*** 2.233*** 2.229*** 1.433*** 1.372*** 
 (0.328) (0.325) (0.297) (0.361) (0.314) (0.292) (0.340) (0.354) 
%Immigrationt-1 2.506 22.471***       
 (4.668) (3.665)       
%Immigrationt-1 -11.503 5.430       
   x Unemploymentt-1 (13.258) (9.508)       
Δ (%Immigrationt-1)   0.296 0.115 0.611*  0.507***  
   (0.596) (0.290) (0.337)  (0.109)  
Δ (%Immigrationt-1)   12.172 10.956  21.195*  13.645*** 
   x Unemploymentt-1   (20.594) (7.961)  (11.359)  (2.632) 
GDP PPS per  0.004** 0.016*** 0.006*** 0.018*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 
   capitat-1 (x 103) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Tax ratet-1 0.199 0.690*** 0.187 0.813*** 0.172 0.200 0.791*** 0.824*** 
 (0.130) (0.230) (0.140) (0.263) (0.141) (0.139) (0.251) (0.260) 
Between regions -0.717* 0.097 -0.869** 0.012 -0.857** -0.880** -0.000 0.017 
    inequalityt-1 (0.373) (0.591) (0.421) (0.772) (0.425) (0.418) (0.795) (0.774) 
Wage sharet-1 0.423** 1.264*** 0.262 1.144*** 0.257 0.274 1.165*** 1.138*** 
 (0.187) (0.204) (0.163) (0.155) (0.166) (0.171) (0.140) (0.162) 
Growth Dummyt-1 -0.002 -0.100*** 0.003 -0.090*** 0.002 0.003 -0.090*** -0.091*** 
 (0.006) (0.022) (0.006) (0.022) (0.006) (0.006) (0.023) (0.022) 
Parliamentary  0.004 -0.011** 0.002 -0.008 0.001 0.002 -0.009* -0.007 
     election Dummyt-1 (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Constant 0.016 -1.117*** 0.174 -0.687*** 0.186 0.164 -0.687*** -0.687*** 
 (0.322) (0.358) (0.157) (0.128) (0.156) (0.154) (0.127) (0.128) 
         
Observations 812 812 780 780 780 780 
Censored 213 498 204 466 204 466 
Uncensored 599 314 576 314 576 314 
Number of clusters 229 229 229 229 229 229 
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo R2 0.539 0.281 0.540 0.330 0.540 0.537 0.318 0.332 
Joint-significance Wald χ2 71.95 163.17 67.85 190.69 64.87 62.21 178.29 191 
Notes: this table reports the results of robustness panel-Tobit estimations after Honoré (1992) of the European extreme right (ER) and populist 
radical right (PRR) vote shares 2000-2014, testing for unemployment-immigration interactions. We check robustness with regards to alternative 
party classification: Parties identified as marginal ER in section A2.4 are now classified as PRR. The table corresponds to Table 3 in the main text. 
Columns (1) and (2) report the estimation, measuring immigration rates (immigrants to natives ratio). Columns (3) and (4) use changes in 
immigration rates. Columns (5)-(8) remove one collinear regressor at a time to check statistical significance of immigration and (immigration x 
unemployment).  Standard errors are given in parentheses below the coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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TABLE A11: ROBUSTNESS-HYPOTHESIS 4:  EFFECT OF INCOME 
INEQUALITY UNDER ALTERNATIVE PARTY CLASSIFICATION 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
 Basic Model Economic regressors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable PRR  ER  PRR  ER  
     
Income inequalityt-1 0.419*** 0.563 0.369* -0.666 
 (0.146) (0.604) (0.221) (0.564) 
Unemployment flowt-1 1.217*** 5.030*** 1.271*** 2.336*** 
 (0.295) (1.420) (0.336) (0.617) 
Δ (%Immigrationt-1) 0.933** 0.687* 1.010** 0.484** 
 (0.451) (0.372) (0.501) (0.198) 
GDP PPS per capitat-1   0.004* 0.025*** 
   (0.003) (0.005) 
Tax ratet-1   0.221 0.532 
   (0.160) (0.336) 
Between regions   -1.277*** -0.206 
    inequalityt-1   (0.474) (0.648) 
Wage sharet-1   0.365** 0.653*** 
   (0.167) (0.251) 
Growth Dummyt-1   0.010 -0.092*** 
   (0.006) (0.018) 
Parliamentary election  0.007 -0.053*** 0.010** -0.021 
   Dummyt (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.014) 
     
Observations 705 705 656 656 
Censored 191 460 171 417 
Uncensored 514 245 485 239 
Number of clusters 248 248 229 229 
Region FE yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo R2 0.547 0.349 0.546 0.350 
Joint-significance Wald χ2 38.32 147.31 61.44 561.06 
Notes: this table reports the results of robustness panel Tobit estimations after Honoré (1992) of 
the European extreme right (ER) and populist radical right (PRR) vote shares 2000-2014, testing 
for the effect of income inequality.  We check robustness with regards to alternative party 
classification: Parties identified as marginal ER in section A2.4 are now classified as PRR. The 
table corresponds to Table 4 in the main text. Columns (1) and (2) report the estimation of 
inequality controlling for unemployment and immigration. Columns (3) and (4) add all other 
controls. Columns (5) and (6) present our preferred specification. Standard errors are given in 
parentheses below the coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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TABLE A12: ROBUSTNESS-HYPOTHESES 1-2: CHECKING FOR DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEN NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS 
Dependent variable PRR ER 
 (1) (2) 
 a b a b 
 regressor x parliamentary 
election Dummy 
regressor x parliamentary 
election Dummy 
     
Unemployment ratet-1 3.189*** -0.868*** 1.075*** 0.408** 
 (0.532) (0.327) (0.381) (0.163) 
Δ (%Immigrationt-1) 0.623**  0.230  
 (0.305)  (0.154)  
GDP PPS per  0.008*** 0.001 0.007** -0.002 
    capitat-1 (x 103) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
Tax ratet-1 0.028 -0.360*** 0.569*** 0.108* 
 (0.246) (0.080) (0.140) (0.060) 
Between regions -0.754 0.171** -0.639 0.023 
    inequalityt-1 (0.667) (0.079) (0.520) (0.060) 
Wage sharet-1 -0.437 0.195* 0.815*** -0.179 
 (0.271) (0.110) (0.184) (0.172) 
Growth Dummyt-1 0.039*** -0.068*** -0.062*** -0.011 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.017) (0.019) 
Parliamentary  -0.072  0.140  
     election Dummyt-1 (0.086)  (0.124)  
     
Observations 780 780 
Censored 274 394 
Uncensored 506 386 
Clusters 229 229 
Region FE yes yes 
Pseudo R2 0.768 0.492 
Joint-significance Wald χ2 164.93 286.29 
Notes: this table reports the results of robustness panel Tobit estimations after Honoré (1992) of the 
European extreme right (ER) and populist radical right (PRR) vote shares 2000-2014.  We check robustness 
of our results testing hypotheses 1 and 2 (contrast Table 2 in the main text) when we allow for differences 
between National and European Parliament elections adding interaction terms between regressors and the 
parliamentary election Dummy. Model (1) estimates the PRR vote whereas model (2) estimates the ER vote. 
Columns (1a), (2a) report coefficients for the regressors (effects in European Parliament elections). Columns 
(1b), (2b) report the difference in the coefficients in National Parliament elections.  Standard errors are given 
in parentheses below the coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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TABLE A13: ROBUSTNESS-HYPOTHESIS 3: CHECKING FOR DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEN NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS 
Dependent variable PRR ER 
 (1) (2) 
 a b a b 
 regressor x parliamentary 
election Dummy 
regressor x parliamentary 
election Dummy 
     
Unemployment ratet-1 2.924*** -0.505 1.067*** 0.349** 
 (0.530) (0.380) (0.402) (0.167) 
Δ (%Immigrationt-1) 1.112 -0.786 0.003 -0.418 
 (0.911) (0.697) (0.398) (0.365) 
Δ (%Immigrationt-1) -24.765 37.747*** -0.497 22.828 
   x Unemploymentt-1 (24.522) (11.774) (17.368) (15.903) 
GDP PPS per  0.007*** 0.003** 0.007** -0.002* 
    capitat-1 (x 103) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
Tax ratet-1 0.083 -0.407*** 0.572*** 0.112* 
 (0.234) (0.094) (0.138) (0.062) 
Between regions -0.734 0.151* -0.635 0.027 
    inequalityt-1 (0.677) (0.080) (0.534) (0.066) 
Wage sharet-1 -0.397 0.174* 0.827*** -0.184 
 (0.273) (0.095) (0.177) (0.154) 
Growth Dummyt-1 0.040** -0.069*** -0.059*** -0.012 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.017) (0.022) 
Parliamentary  -0.098  0.148  
     election Dummyt-1 (0.074)  (0.225)  
     
Observations 780 780 
Censored 274 394 
Uncensored 506 386 
Clusters 229 229 
Region FE yes yes 
Pseudo R2 0.731 0.711 
Joint-significance Wald χ2 177.33 304.22 
Notes: this table reports the results of robustness panel Tobit estimations after Honoré (1992) of the 
European extreme right (ER) and populist radical right (PRR) vote shares 2000-2014.  We check robustness 
of our results testing hypothesis 3 (contrast Table 3 in the main text), when we allow for differences between 
National and European Parliament elections adding interaction terms between regressors and the 
parliamentary election Dummy. Model (1) estimates the PRR vote whereas model (2) estimates the ER vote. 
Columns (1a), (2a) report coefficients for the regressors (effects in European Parliament elections). Columns 
(1b), (2b) report the difference in the coefficients in National Parliament elections.  Standard errors are given 
in parentheses below the coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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TABLE A14: ROBUSTNESS-HYPOTHESIS 4: CHECKING FOR DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEN NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS 
Dependent variable PRR ER 
 (1) (2) 
 a b a b 
 regressor x parliamentary 
election Dummy 
regressor x parliamentary 
election Dummy 
     
Income inequalityt-1 1.852*** -0.781* -0.976** 0.281 
 (0.571) (0.401) (0.394) (0.178) 
Unemployment ratet-1 2.298*** -0.878*** 2.251*** -0.217 
 (0.585) (0.340) (0.499) (0.441) 
Δ (%Immigrationt-1) 0.320 0.678 -0.045 0.058 
 (0.470) (0.461) (0.265) (0.155) 
GDP PPS per  0.006* 0.002*** 0.013*** -0.004*** 
    capitat-1 (x 103) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
Tax ratet-1 0.187 -0.236** 0.318** 0.280*** 
 (0.257) (0.097) (0.133) (0.077) 
Between regions -2.151*** 0.390*** -0.848* -0.127 
    inequalityt-1 (0.774) (0.116) (0.461) (0.091) 
Wage sharet-1 0.025 -0.190 0.863*** -0.270** 
 (0.304) (0.155) (0.150) (0.133) 
Growth Dummyt-1 0.050*** -0.070*** -0.065*** -0.011 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) 
Parliamentary  0.398**  0.170  
     election Dummyt-1 (0.198)  (0.144)  
     
Observations 656 656 
Censored 233 353 
Uncensored 423 303 
Clusters 229 229 
Region FE yes yes 
Pseudo R2 0.866 0.647 
Joint-significance Wald χ2 201.24 358.85 
Notes: this table reports the results of robustness panel Tobit estimations after Honoré (1992) of the 
European extreme right (ER) and populist radical right (PRR) vote shares 2000-2014.  We check robustness 
of our results testing hypothesis 4 (contrast Table 4 in the main text), when we allow for differences 
between National and European Parliament elections adding interaction terms between regressors and the 
parliamentary election Dummy. Model (1) estimates the PRR vote whereas model (2) estimates the ER vote. 
Columns (1a), (2a) report coefficients for the regressors (effects in European Parliament elections). Columns 
(1b), (2b) report the difference in the coefficients in National Parliament elections.  Standard errors are given 
in parentheses below the coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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TABLE A15: ROBUSTNESS-HYPOTHESES 1-2: CHECKING FOR DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE 
Dependent variable PRR ER 
 (1) (2) 
 a b a b 
 regressor x East Europe 
Dummy 
regressor x East Europe 
Dummy 
     
Unemployment ratet-1 1.715*** 0.179 0.800*** 0.528 
 (0.503) (0.697) (0.201) (0.619) 
Δ (%Immigrationt-1) 0.707* -1.775 0.316** -1.771 
 (0.382) (11.565) (0.161) (2.149) 
GDP PPS per  0.011*** -0.023 0.008*** -0.007* 
    capitat-1 (x 103) (0.003) (0.018) (0.002) (0.004) 
Tax ratet-1 -0.150 -1.288** 0.377** 0.117 
 (0.241) (0.501) (0.191) (0.218) 
Between regions -1.541** 2.564** -0.917 0.541 
    inequalityt-1 (0.719) (1.130) (0.702) (1.030) 
Wage sharet-1 0.615* -1.352* 0.021 0.917*** 
 (0.321) (0.802) (0.176) (0.235) 
Growth Dummyt-1 0.009 0.022 -0.050** -0.029 
 (0.008) (0.027) (0.021) (0.031) 
Parliamentary  0.000 -0.025 -0.016*** 0.015 
     election Dummyt-1 (0.006) (0.017) (0.006) (0.011) 
     
Observations 780 780 
Censored 274 394 
Uncensored 506 386 
Clusters 229 229 
Region FE yes yes 
Pseudo R2 0.530 0.407 
Joint-significance Wald χ2 172.94 444.61 
Notes: this table reports the results of robustness panel Tobit estimations after Honoré (1992) of the 
European extreme right (ER) and populist radical right (PRR) vote shares 2000-2014.  We check 
robustness of our results testing hypotheses 1 and 2 (contrast Table 2 in the main text), when we allow 
for differences in the effects of our regressors between Western and Eastern Europe, adding 
interaction terms between regressors and a Dummy for Eastern European countries. Model (1) 
estimates the PRR vote whereas model (2) estimates the ER vote. Columns (1a), (2a) report coefficients 
for the regressors (effects in Western Europe). Columns (1b), (2b) report the difference in the 
coefficients in Eastern European elections.  Standard errors are given in parentheses below the 
coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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TABLE A16: ROBUSTNESS-HYPOTHESIS 3: CHECKING FOR DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE 
Dependent variable PRR ER 
 (1) (2) 
 a b a b 
 regressor x East Europe 
Dummy 
regressor x East Europe 
Dummy 
     
Unemployment ratet-1 1.715*** 0.179 0.723*** 0.473 
 (0.503) (0.697) (0.193) (0.638) 
Δ (%Immigrationt-1) 0.707* -1.775 -0.308* -5.121 
 (0.382) (11.565) (0.160) (7.994) 
Δ (%Immigrationt-1)   16.932*** 129.736 
   x Unemploymentt-1   (4.481) (209.670) 
GDP PPS per  0.011*** -0.023 0.007*** -0.006 
    capitat-1 (x 103) (0.003) (0.018) (0.002) (0.004) 
Tax ratet-1 -0.150 -1.288** 0.403** 0.098 
 (0.241) (0.501) (0.205) (0.239) 
Between regions -1.541** 2.564** -0.958 0.564 
    inequalityt-1 (0.719) (1.130) (0.738) (1.027) 
Wage sharet-1 0.615* -1.352* -0.055 0.971*** 
 (0.321) (0.802) (0.168) (0.239) 
Growth Dummyt-1 0.009 0.022 -0.049*** -0.025 
 (0.008) (0.027) (0.018) (0.029) 
Parliamentary  0.000 -0.025 -0.014** 0.014 
     election Dummyt-1 (0.006) (0.017) (0.005) (0.011) 
     
Observations 780 780 
Censored 274 394 
Uncensored 506 386 
Clusters 229 229 
Region FE yes yes 
Pseudo R2 0.530 0.523 
Joint-significance Wald χ2 172.94 456.06 
Notes: this table reports the results of robustness panel Tobit estimations after Honoré (1992) of the 
European extreme right (ER) and populist radical right (PRR) vote shares 2000-2014.  We check robustness 
of our results testing hypothesis 3 (contrast table 3 in the main text), when we allow for differences in the 
effects of our regressors between Western and Eastern Europe, adding interaction terms between 
regressors and a Dummy for Eastern European countries. Model (1) estimates the PRR vote whereas 
model (2) estimates the ER vote. Columns (1a), (2a) report coefficients for the regressors (effects in 
Western Europe). Columns (1b), (2b) report the difference in the coefficients in Eastern European 
elections.  Standard errors are given in parentheses below the coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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TABLE A17: ROBUSTNESS-HYPOTHESIS 4: CHECKING FOR DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE 
Dependent variable PRR ER 
 (1) (2) 
 a b a b 
 regressor x East Europe 
Dummy 
regressor x East Europe 
Dummy 
     
Income inequalityt-1 1.093*** -0.669 1.180** -2.907*** 
 (0.401) (0.437) (0.531) (0.635) 
Unemployment ratet-1 1.953*** -1.862*** 0.001 0.973* 
 (0.549) (0.649) (0.277) (0.520) 
Δ (%Immigrationt-1) 0.922* 0.043 0.544** -4.738** 
 (0.492) (1.781) (0.243) (2.373) 
GDP PPS per  0.008** -0.010* 0.004** 0.001 
    capitat-1 (x 103) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) 
Tax ratet-1 0.145 -0.319 -0.343 0.576 
 (0.292) (0.469) (0.405) (0.419) 
Between regions -2.023** 1.350 -0.699 0.460 
    inequalityt-1 (0.899) (1.113) (0.622) (0.798) 
Wage sharet-1 0.366 -0.717 0.155 1.344*** 
 (0.420) (0.448) (0.362) (0.397) 
Growth ratet-1 0.008 -0.020 -0.055* 0.033 
 (0.012) (0.018) (0.030) (0.036) 
Parliamentary  0.016 -0.020* -0.042*** 0.060*** 
     election Dummyt-1 (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) 
     
Observations 656 656 
Censored 233 353 
Uncensored 423 303 
Clusters 229 229 
Region FE yes yes 
Pseudo R2 0.554 0.523 
Joint-significance Wald χ2 156.13 542.55 
Notes: this table reports the results of robustness panel Tobit estimations after Honoré (1992) of the 
European extreme right (ER) and populist radical right (PRR) vote shares 2000-2014.  We check robustness 
of our results testing hypothesis 4 (contrast table 4 in the main text), when we allow for differences in the 
effects of our regressors between Western and Eastern Europe, adding interaction terms between regressors 
and a Dummy for Eastern European countries. Model (1) estimates the PRR vote whereas model (2) 
estimates the ER vote. Columns (1a), (2a) report coefficients for the regressors (effects in Western Europe). 
Columns (1b), (2b) report the difference in the coefficients in Eastern European elections.  Standard errors 
are given in parentheses below the coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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TABLE A18: ROBUSTNESS-DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PRR AND ER REMAIN AFTER EAST VS 
WEST DIVISION 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 2 
 Whole sample (Table 
2, columns 1,2) 
Western Europe Eastern Europe 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable PRR ER PRR ER PRR ER 
       
Unemployment ratet-1 2.478*** 1.359*** 1.715*** 0.800*** 1.893*** 1.328** 
 (0.330) (0.401) (0.503) (0.201) (0.445) (0.586) 
Δ (%Immigrationt-1) 0.706** 0.243* 0.707* 0.316** -1.106 -1.454 
 (0.309) (0.139) (0.382) (0.161) (1.603) (2.143) 
GDP PPS per  0.009*** 0.006** 0.011*** 0.008*** -0.012 0.001 
   capitat-1 (x 103) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.014) (0.003) 
Tax ratet-1 -0.184 0.662*** -0.150 0.377** -1.438*** 0.494*** 
 (0.242) (0.128) (0.241) (0.191) (0.424) (0.105) 
Between regions -0.984* -0.609 -1.541** -0.917 1.023 -0.376 
    inequalityt-1 (0.593) (0.478) (0.719) (0.702) (0.890) (0.755) 
Wage sharet-1 0.066 0.612*** 0.615* 0.021 -0.736 0.938*** 
 (0.287) (0.142) (0.321) (0.176) (0.543) (0.157) 
Growth ratet-1 0.004 -0.076*** 0.009 -0.050** 0.031 -0.079*** 
 (0.007) (0.020) (0.008) (0.021) (0.027) (0.022) 
Parliamentary  -0.002 -0.007* 0.000 -0.016*** -0.025* -0.001 
     election Dummyt-1 (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.010) 
       
Observations 780 780 562 562 218 218 
Censored 274 394 161 273 113 121 
Uncensored 506 386 401 289 105 97 
Number of clusters 229 229 174 174 55 55 
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo R2 0.541 0.418 0.543 0.442 0.416 0.283 
Joint-significance Wald χ2 83.43 53.07 66.35 336.12 106.56 108.49 
Notes: this table reports the results of robustness panel Tobit estimations after Honoré (1992) of the European extreme 
right (ER) and populist radical right (PRR) vote shares 2000-2014. We test robustness of hypotheses 1 and 2 (contrast 
table 2 in the main text), confining the sample to Western Europe and Eastern Europe only. Columns (1) and (2) repeat 
estimations of Table 1, columns (1) and (2) in the main text for the whole sample. Columns (3) and (4) estimate the 
same model for Western Europe. Columns (5) and (6) estimate the same model for Eastern Europe.  . Standard errors 
are given in parentheses below the coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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TABLE A19: PANEL SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR EAST VS WEST 
  Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Western 
Europe 
ER (censored) overall 0.021 0.027 0.000 0.254 N =     289 
 between  0.019 0.001 0.089 n =     102 
    within  0.021 -0.052 0.186 T = 2.833 
  
ER (uncensored) overall 0.011 0.022 0.000 0.254 N =     562 
 between  0.018 0.000 0.089 n =     174 
    within  0.015 -0.063 0.175 T = 3.229 
  Unemployment overall 0.031 0.023 0.003 0.118 N =     562 
    between  0.022 0.003 0.099 n =     174 
    within  0.008 0.000 0.074 T = 3.229 
  % Immigration overall 0.051 0.043 0.000 0.402 N =     562 
    between  0.048 0.000 0.402 n =     174 
    within  0.001 0.044 0.059 T = 3.229 
  Δ (% Immigration) overall -0.009 0.035 -0.313 0.115 N =     562 
    between  0.029 -0.217 0.037 n =     174 
    within  0.019 -0.189 0.111 T = 3.229 
  Inequality overall 0.294 0.033 0.240 0.378 N =     473 
    between  0.031 0.240 0.358 n =     174 
    within   0.013 0.268 0.320 T = 2.718 
Eastern 
Europe 
ER (censored) overall 0.073 0.058 0.007 0.255 N =      97 
  between  0.043 0.007 0.165 n =      28 
    within  0.046 -0.067 0.178 T = 3.464 
  ER (uncensored) overall 0.032 0.053 0.000 0.255 N =     218 
    between  0.035 0.000 0.115 n =      55 
    within  0.038 -0.066 0.189 T = 3.963 
  Unemployment overall 0.051 0.035 0.007 0.181 N =     218 
    between  0.027 0.012 0.129 n =      55 
    within  0.020 -0.012 0.103 T = 3.963 
  % Immigration overall 0.007 0.010 0.000 0.063 N =     218 
    between  0.010 0.000 0.063 n =      55 
    within  0.000 0.006 0.007 T = 3.963 
  Δ (% Immigration) overall 0.001 0.006 -0.039 0.036 N =     218 
    between  0.002 -0.008 0.009 n =      55 
    within  0.006 -0.037 0.038 T = 3.963 
  Inequality overall 0.295 0.045 0.220 0.378 N =     183 
    between  0.038 0.231 0.368 n =      55 
    within  0.020 0.244 0.343 T = 3.327 
Notes: this table reports detailed panel data summary statistics for Western and Eastern region and for 
the sample of our main estimation testing hypotheses 1-3. The summary stats for the ER vote share are 
given for both the censored and the uncensored sample. The upper panel presents the summary statistics 
for Western Europe. The bottom panel for Eastern Europe. 
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TABLE A20: ROBUSTNESS-HYPOTHESES 1 AND 2 USING GROWTH 
RATES INSTEAD OF GROWTH DUMMIES 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
 Unemployment-
immigration 
Unemployment-
immigration + Ec. 
Covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable PRR ER PRR ER 
     
Unemployment ratet-1 2.162*** 1.080** 2.503*** 1.358*** 
 (0.239) (0.535) (0.322) (0.387) 
Δ (%Immigrationt-1) 0.474** 0.264** 0.660** 0.298*** 
 (0.233) (0.108) (0.290) (0.111) 
GDP PPS per    0.009*** 0.008** 
   capitat-1 (x 103)   (0.003) (0.003) 
Tax ratet-1   -0.118 0.714*** 
   (0.239) (0.167) 
Between regions   -0.699 -0.488 
    inequalityt-1   (0.580) (0.591) 
Wage sharet-1   -0.139 0.711*** 
   (0.298) (0.137) 
Growth ratet-1   -0.165* -0.407*** 
   (0.086) (0.107) 
Parliamentary  -0.001 -0.017*** 0.004 -0.005 
     election Dummyt-1 (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
Observations 842 842 776 776 
Censored 294 450 274 390 
Uncensored 548 392 502 386 
Number of clusters 248 248 225 225 
Region FE yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo R2 0.622 0.442 0.553 0.403 
Joint-significance Wald χ2 91.69 18.2 84.76 72.89 
Notes: this table reports the results of robustness panel Tobit estimations after Honoré (1992) 
of the European extreme right (ER) and populist radical right (PRR) vote shares 2000-2014. We 
test robustness of hypotheses 1 and 2 (contrast table 2 in the main text), using growth rates 
instead of growth dummies. Columns (1) and (2) report the estimation of the basic model 
testing hypotheses 1 and 2. Columns (3) and (4) add economic controls. Standard errors are 
given in parentheses below the coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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TABLE A21: ROBUSTNESS-HYPOTHESIS 3 USING GROWTH RATES 
INSTEAD OF GROWTH DUMMIES 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
 Immigration rates Changes in 
immigration rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable PRR  ER  PRR  ER  
     
Unemployment ratet-1 2.850*** 1.433*** 2.502*** 1.290*** 
 (0.382) (0.467) (0.325) (0.399) 
%Immigrationt-1 9.909* 13.349***   
 (5.196) (4.903)   
%Immigrationt-1 -12.709 -4.482   
   x Unemploymentt-1 (16.639) (9.903)   
Δ (%Immigrationt-1)   0.670 -0.455 
   (0.516) (0.312) 
Δ (%Immigrationt-1)   -0.381 26.404** 
   x Unemploymentt-1   (16.782) (12.661) 
GDP PPS per  0.011*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.008** 
   capitat-1 (x 103) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Tax ratet-1 -0.096 0.703*** -0.119 0.722*** 
 (0.238) (0.168) (0.244) (0.163) 
Between regions -0.873 -0.480 -0.698 -0.518 
    inequalityt-1 (0.602) (0.571) (0.580) (0.610) 
Wage sharet-1 0.086 0.707*** -0.140 0.732*** 
 (0.388) (0.135) (0.292) (0.140) 
Growth ratet-1 -0.176* -0.429*** -0.166* -0.398*** 
 (0.104) (0.105) (0.085) (0.105) 
Parliamentary  0.006 -0.005 0.004 -0.003 
     election Dummyt-1 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
Observations 776 776 776 776 
Censored 274 390 274 390 
Uncensored 502 386 502 386 
Number of clusters 225 225 225 225 
Region FE yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo R2 0.557 0.411 0.553 0.401 
Joint-significance Wald χ2 95.42 74.89 88.92 78.32 
Notes: this table reports the results of robustness panel Tobit estimations after Honoré (1992) of the 
European extreme right (ER) and populist radical right (PRR) vote shares 2000-2014. We test 
robustness of hypothesis 3 (contrast table 3 in the main text), using growth rates instead of growth 
dummies. Columns (1) and (2) report the estimation of the basic model-testing hypothesis 3. Columns 
(3) and (4) add economic controls. Standard errors are given in parentheses below the coefficients. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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TABLE A22: ROBUSTNESS-HYPOTHESIS 4:  EFFECT OF INCOME INEQUALITY 
USING GROWTH RATES INSTEAD OF GROWTH DUMMIES 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
 Basic Model Economic regressors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable PRR  ER  PRR  ER  
     
Income inequalityt-1 0.947*** -0.194 1.125*** -0.673** 
 (0.119) (0.219) (0.325) (0.323) 
Unemployment ratet-1 1.486*** 2.162** 1.511*** 1.985*** 
 (0.347) (0.886) (0.403) (0.525) 
Δ (%Immigrationt-1) 0.989** 0.288*** 0.994** 0.287** 
 (0.476) (0.107) (0.431) (0.144) 
GDP PPS per    0.008** 0.011*** 
   capitat-1 (x 103)   (0.003) (0.004) 
Tax ratet-1   0.168 0.686*** 
   (0.277) (0.167) 
Between regions   -1.741** -0.769 
    inequalityt-1   (0.677) (0.631) 
Wage sharet-1   -0.172 0.682*** 
   (0.275) (0.146) 
Growth Dummyt-1   -0.168* -0.398*** 
   (0.089) (0.114) 
Parliamentary election  0.013** -0.039*** 0.023*** -0.020*** 
   Dummyt (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
     
Observations 705 705 652 652 
Censored 253 396 233 349 
Uncensored 452 309 419 303 
Number of clusters 248 248 225 225 
Region FE yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo R2 0.607 0.519 0.584 0.440 
Joint-significance Wald χ2 91.05 95.84 84.76 141 
Notes: this table reports the results of robustness panel Tobit estimations after Honoré (1992) of the 
European extreme right (ER) and populist radical right (PRR) vote shares 2000-2014. We test robustness of 
hypothesis 4 (contrast table 4 in the main text), using growth rates instead of growth dummies. Columns 
(1) and (2) report the estimation of the basic model-testing hypothesis 4. Columns (3) and (4) add 
economic controls. Standard errors are given in parentheses below the coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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TABLE A23: Observations in regressions testing Hypotheses 1-4 
Country # Observations 
in our base 
model 
(hypotheses 1-3) 
# Observations 
with income 
inequality 
(hypothesis 4) 
% 
Observations 
lost 
Austria 20 20 0 
Belgium 50 42 16 
Bulgaria 18 18 0 
Czech Rep. 31 23 26 
Denmark 8 8 0 
Estonia 7 5 29 
Finland 10 10 0 
France 87 87 0 
Germany 130 64 51 
Greece 39 39 0 
Hungary 35 35 0 
Ireland 10 10 0 
Italy 50 50 0 
Latvia 4 4 0 
Lithuania 4 3 25 
Luxembourg 1 1 0 
Netherlands 56 56 0 
Norway 4 4 0 
Poland 64 48 25 
Portugal 15 15 0 
Romania 39 39 0 
Slovakia 24 16 33 
Slovenia 8 8 0 
Sweden 24 18 25 
U.K. 74 65 12 
    
Total 812 688 30 
Notes: this table reports the number of NUTS 2 regions used in our regressions 
testing hypotheses 1-4 by country. Column 1 lists countries. Column 2 lists 
observations used in our regressions testing hypotheses 1-3 by country. Column 3 
lists observations used in our testing of hypothesis 4. Column 4 reports the 
percentage of observations lost when testing hypothesis 4 compared to observations 
in our tests of hypotheses 1-3. 
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TABLE A24: ROBUSTNESS-HYPOTHESIS 4 - EFFECT OF INCOME 
INEQUALITY WITH IMPUTED MISSING INCOME INEQUALITY DATA 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
 Basic Model Economic regressors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable PRR  ER  PRR  ER  
     
Income inequalityt-1 0.563*** 0.083 0.337 -0.644** 
 (0.132) (0.204) (0.233) (0.290) 
Unemployment ratet-1 2.402*** 1.110** 2.584*** 1.282*** 
 (0.219) (0.496) (0.283) (0.306) 
Δ (%Immigrationt-1) 0.478** 0.271** 0.708** 0.258*** 
 (0.227) (0.110) (0.303) (0.099) 
GDP PPS per    0.008*** 0.010*** 
   capitat-1 (x 103)   (0.003) (0.004) 
Tax ratet-1   -0.104 0.683*** 
   (0.246) (0.125) 
Between regions   -1.097* -0.754 
    inequalityt-1   (0.564) (0.472) 
Wage sharet-1   0.067 0.608*** 
   (0.302) (0.125) 
Growth Dummyt-1   0.004 -0.069*** 
   (0.008) (0.018) 
Parliamentary election  -0.001 -0.017*** -0.001 -0.004 
   Dummyt (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
     
Observations 842 842 780 780 
Censored 294 450 274 394 
Uncensored 548 392 506 386 
Number of clusters 248 248 229 229 
Region FE yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo R2 0.628 0.444 0.552 0.394 
Joint-significance Wald χ2 184.29 21.76 147.13 72.26 
Notes: this table reports the results of robustness panel Tobit estimations after Honoré (1992) 
of the European extreme right (ER) and populist radical right (PRR) vote shares 2000-2014, 
testing for the effect of income inequality (contrast with table 4 in the main text). We check 
robustness of our results when we impute missing inequality values with their last observed 
value for each NUTS 2 region. Columns (1) and (2) report the estimation of inequality 
controlling for unemployment and immigration. Columns (3) and (4) add all other controls. 
Standard errors are given in parentheses below the coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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TABLE A25: ROBUSTNESS-HYPOTHESIS 4: CHECKING FOR DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE WITH IMPUTED MISSING INCOME 
INEQUALITY DATA 
Dependent variable PRR ER 
 (1) (2) 
 a b a b 
 regressor x East Europe 
Dummy 
regressor x East Europe 
Dummy 
     
Income inequalityt-1 0.455* -0.716 0.171 -1.989*** 
 (0.268) (0.689) (0.313) (0.501) 
Unemployment ratet-1 1.691*** 0.044 0.771*** -0.154 
 (0.492) (0.791) (0.190) (0.387) 
Δ (%Immigrationt-1) 0.736** -1.805 0.315** 0.065 
 (0.366) (1.740) (0.144) (0.400) 
GDP PPS per  0.010*** -0.022 0.007** 0.002 
    capitat-1 (x 103) (0.003) (0.015) (0.003) (0.007) 
Tax ratet-1 -0.120 -1.533* 0.347 -0.130 
 (0.248) (0.829) (0.229) (0.250) 
Between regions -1.667** 2.735** -0.867 0.843 
    inequalityt-1 (0.811) (1.180) (0.687) (0.930) 
Wage sharet-1 0.677 -1.388** 0.045 1.406*** 
 (0.419) (0.683) (0.171) (0.293) 
Growth ratet-1 0.011 0.026 -0.048** 0.024 
 (0.010) (0.033) (0.024) (0.031) 
Parliamentary  0.001 -0.028 -0.017*** 0.046*** 
     election Dummyt-1 (0.008) (0.019) (0.006) (0.014) 
     
Observations 780 780 
Censored 274 394 
Uncensored 506 386 
Clusters 229 229 
Region FE yes yes 
Pseudo R2 0.524 0.547 
Joint-significance Wald χ2 251.95 465.61 
Notes: this table reports the results of robustness panel Tobit estimations after Honoré (1992) of the European extreme 
right (ER) and populist radical right (PRR) vote shares 2000-2014.  We check robustness of our results when we allow for 
differences in the effects of our regressors between Western and Eastern Europe, adding interaction terms between 
regressors and a Dummy for Eastern European countries. We impute missing income inequality values with their last 
observed value for the region. Model (1) estimates the PRR vote whereas model (2) estimates the ER vote. Columns (1a), 
(2a) report coefficients for the regressors (effects in Western Europe). Columns (1b), (2b) report the effect difference in 
the coefficients in Eastern European elections.  Standard errors are given in parentheses below the coefficients. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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TABLE A26: ROBUSTNESS-HYPOTHESES 1 AND 2 USING RANDOM 
EFFECTS AND CONTROLLING FOR COUNTRY EFFECTS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable PRR PRR ER ER 
     
Unemployment ratet-1 1.561*** 0.955*** 0.401*** 0.406*** 
 (0.183) (0.193) (0.121) (0.089) 
Δ (%Immigrationt-1) 0.577*** 0.515*** 0.244** 0.116 
 (0.161) (0.167) (0.097) (0.075) 
GDP PPS per  0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.000 
   capitat-1 (x 103) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tax ratet-1 0.369*** 0.084 -0.075 0.043 
 (0.089) (0.104) (0.050) (0.033) 
Between regions -0.155 0.054 0.111* -0.053* 
    inequalityt-1 (0.102) (0.088) (0.059) (0.031) 
Wage sharet-1 -0.092 -0.288*** 0.026 0.180*** 
 (0.069) (0.112) (0.040) (0.045) 
Growth ratet-1 -0.009 -0.020*** -0.031*** -0.038*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
Parliamentary  0.001 0.001 -0.009** -0.010*** 
     election Dummyt-1 (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
country = 1, Austria      0.165***  -0.243 
  (0.029)  (12.214) 
country = 2, Belgium  0.202***  -0.255 
  (0.023)  (7.511) 
country = 3, Bulgaria  0.128***  -0.203 
  (0.030)  (13.472) 
country = 6, Czech Rep.  -0.027  -0.064*** 
  (0.027)  (0.011) 
country = 7, Finland  0.151***  -0.214 
  (0.036)  (18.535) 
country = 8, France  0.121***  -0.236 
  (0.018)  (5.883) 
country = 10, Greece  -0.046  0.034*** 
  (0.031)  (0.011) 
country = 11, Hungary  0.025  0.041*** 
  (0.026)  (0.008) 
country = 12, Estonia  0.008  -0.036** 
  (0.043)  (0.015) 
country = 13, Italy  0.001  0.029*** 
  (0.024)  (0.009) 
country = 14, Latvia  0.066  -0.021 
  (0.059)  (0.019) 
country = 15, Netherlands  0.127***  -0.251 
  (0.027)  (7.238) 
country = 16, Norway  0.299***  -0.220 
  (0.048)  (29.630) 
country = 17, Poland  0.046*  -0.179 
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  (0.027)  (8.122) 
country = 18, Portugal  -0.401  -0.016 
  (34.472)  (0.010) 
     
country = 19, Romania  -0.396  0.081*** 
  (28.931)  (0.008) 
country = 20, Slovakia  -0.501  0.024*** 
  (39.678)  (0.009) 
country = 21, Slovenia  0.092**  -0.209 
  (0.042)  (20.631) 
country = 22, Sweden  0.054  -0.261 
  (0.037)  (11.514) 
country = 24, U.K.  -0.398  -0.011 
  (14.844)  (0.009) 
country = 25, Denmark  0.210***  -0.238 
  (0.045)  (20.616) 
country = 26, Ireland  -0.378  -0.227 
  (56.970)  (17.502) 
country = 27, Lithuania  -0.442  -0.183 
  (80.236)  (28.081) 
country = 28, Luxembourg  -0.467  -0.250 
  (100.082)  (55.300) 
Constant -0.044 0.110 -0.035 -0.093*** 
 (0.053) (0.081) (0.032) (0.032) 
     
Observations 842 842 780 780 
Censored 294 450 274 394 
Uncensored 548 392 506 386 
Number of clusters 248 248 229 229 
Country effects no yes no yes 
RE yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo R2 0.020 0.369 0.002 0.196 
Notes: this table reports the results of robustness random effects panel Tobit estimations 
of the European extreme right (ER) and populist radical right (PRR) vote shares 2000-
2014. We estimate hypotheses 1 and 2 (contrast table 2 in the main text) assuming 
random regional effects. Columns (1) and (3) report the estimation of the basic model 
testing hypotheses 1 and 2. with random effects.  Columns (2) and (4) add country 
dummies. Standard errors are given in parentheses below the coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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TABLE A27: OLS FIXED EFFECTS WITH S.E. CLUSTERED AT NUTS 2 
AND COUNTRY LEVELS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable PRR ER PRR ER 
     
Unemployment ratet-1 1.774*** 1.774** 0.799*** 0.799*** 
 (0.258) (0.687) (0.150) (0.167) 
Δ (%Immigrationt-1) 0.379** 0.379 0.225*** 0.225*** 
 (0.183) (0.251) (0.058) (0.066) 
GDP PPS per  0.006*** 0.006 0.002** 0.002 
   capitat-1 (x 103) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tax ratet-1 0.193 0.193 0.479*** 0.479*** 
 (0.209) (0.416) (0.076) (0.074) 
Between regions -0.649 -0.649 -0.476 -0.476 
    inequalityt-1 (0.425) (0.674) (0.332) (0.374) 
Wage sharet-1 0.237 0.237 0.192** 0.192* 
 (0.204) (0.423) (0.077) (0.101) 
Growth Dummyt-1 0.011** 0.011 -0.033*** -0.033** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) 
Parliamentary  -0.000 -0.000 -0.010*** -0.010 
     election Dummyt-1 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) 
Constant -0.262* -0.262 -0.126 -0.126 
 (0.151) (0.321) (0.080) (0.098) 
     
Observations 506 506 386 386 
Number of NUTS 2 172 172 130 130 
Region FE yes yes yes yes 
se clustering level NUTS 2 Country NUTS 2 Country 
Adjusted R2 0.170 0.170 0.336 0.336 
Notes: this table reports the results of fixed effects OLS estimations of the European 
extreme right (ER) and populist radical right (PRR) vote shares 2000-2014, using 
different levels of clustering standard errors. Columns (1) and (3) cluster se at the 
NUTS 2 level. Columns (2) and (4) report estimations with clustering at the country 
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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TABLE 28: HYPOTHESES 1 AND 2, CONTROLLING FOR EDUCATION 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
 Tertiary education Lower education 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable PRR ER PRR ER 
     
Unemployment ratet-1 2.490*** 1.464*** 2.528*** 1.348*** 
 (0.340) (0.437) (0.331) (0.325) 
Δ (%Immigrationt-1) 0.683** 0.241* 0.760** 0.163 
 (0.285) (0.137) (0.328) (0.164) 
Tertiary education 0.002 -0.001   
     (% population) (0.002) (0.003)   
Lower 2ndary ed.    0.002 -0.005 
     (% population)   (0.002) (0.003) 
GDP PPS per  0.007** 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.003 
   capitat-1 (x 103) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Tax ratet-1 -0.102 0.647*** -0.302 0.711*** 
 (0.254) (0.149) (0.293) (0.143) 
Between regions -0.968 -0.688 -0.947 -0.867* 
    inequalityt-1 (0.611) (0.482) (0.595) (0.443) 
Wage sharet-1 -0.030 0.614*** 0.150 0.400** 
 (0.300) (0.139) (0.302) (0.163) 
Growth Dummyt-1 0.007 -0.081*** 0.003 -0.068*** 
 (0.007) (0.020) (0.007) (0.019) 
Parliamentary  -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 -0.008* 
     election Dummyt-1 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
     
Observations 764 764 764 764 
Censored 263 384 263 384 
Uncensored 501 380 501 380 
Number of clusters 225 225 225 225 
Region FE yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo R2 0.548 0.420 0.536 0.412 
Joint-significance Wald χ2 94.17 47.86  90.70  61.92 
Notes: this table reports the results of panel Tobit estimations after Honoré (1992) of the 
European extreme right (ER) and populist radical right (PRR) vote shares 2000-2014 
controlling for education. Columns (1) and (2) report the estimation of the basic model 
testing hypotheses 1 and 2 controlling for the percentage of the population with tertiary 
education. Columns (3) and (4) control for the percentage of people with lower secondary 
education. Columns (5) and (6) include only statistically significant regressors. Standard 
errors are given in parentheses below the coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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TABLE 29: HYPOTHESES 1 AND 2. GDP AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
 GDP - Unemployment GDP quartiles 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable PRR ER PRR ER 
     
Unemployment ratet-1 4.317*** 1.232** 2.168*** 1.210*** 
 (0.554) (0.603) (0.311) (0.447) 
GDP PPS per  0.013*** 0.006**   
   capitat-1 (x 103) (0.002) (0.003)   
Unemploymentt-1 x GDPt-1 -0.140*** 0.011   
 (0.034) (0.029)   
2nd quartile of GDPt-1   0.005 0.035*** 
   (0.018) (0.012) 
3rd quartile of GDPt-1   0.008 0.079*** 
   (0.021) (0.027) 
4th quartile of GDPt-1   0.087*** 0.108*** 
   (0.032) (0.029) 
Δ (%Immigrationt-1) 0.809** 0.242* 0.719 0.182 
 (0.366) (0.132) (0.505) (0.111) 
Tax ratet-1 -0.390 0.673*** -0.113 0.600*** 
 (0.245) (0.135) (0.316) (0.116) 
Between regions -0.850 -0.618 -0.397 -0.352 
    inequalityt-1 (0.532) (0.467) (0.545) (0.482) 
Wage sharet-1 0.197 0.618*** 0.124 0.630*** 
 (0.306) (0.141) (0.301) (0.135) 
Growth Dummyt-1 0.010 -0.076*** 0.005 -0.078*** 
 (0.007) (0.020) (0.007) (0.018) 
Parliamentary  0.002 -0.007* 0.000 -0.010** 
     election Dummyt-1 (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
Observations 780 780 780 780 
Censored 274 394 274 394 
Uncensored 506 386 506 386 
Number of clusters 229 229 229 229 
Region FE yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo R2 0.554 0.418 0.541 0.400 
Joint-significance Wald χ2 144.66 55.23 132.73   62.36 
Notes: this table reports the results of panel Tobit estimations after Honoré (1992) of the European extreme 
right (ER) and populist radical right (PRR) vote shares 2000-2014 controlling for unemployment-GDP 
interaction and for GDP level effects. Columns (1) and (2) report the estimation of the basic model testing 
hypotheses 1 and 2 controlling for unemployment-GDP interaction. Columns (3) and (4) introduce dummies 
for different GDP quartiles. Standard errors are given in parentheses below the coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
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TABLE  A30: ROBUSTNES OF HYPOTHESES 1-3 TO EXCLUDING COUNTRIES THAT EXTEND VOTING RIGHTS 
TO IMMIGRANTS 
  MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 
  
Unemployment-
immigration + Ec. 
Covariates 
Immigration rates Changes in immigration rates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable PRR ER PRR  ER  PRR  ER  
   
          
Unemployment 2.668*** 1.808*** 2.587*** 1.568*** 2.804*** 2.668*** 1.766*** 
    ratet-1 (0.359) (0.440) (0.411) (0.468) (0.366) (0.359) (0.458) 
%Immigrationt-1 
  
2.029 85.073*** 
   
   
(4.270) (21.103) 
   %Immigrationt-1 
  
-31.109*** -30.249** 
      x Unemploymentt-1 
  
(11.538) (15.420) 
   Δ (%Immigrationt-1) 0.723** 0.144   
 
-0.488 0.723** -0.133 
 
(0.361) (0.118)   
 
(0.687) (0.361) (0.537) 
Δ (%Immigrationt-1) 
  
  
 
51.854** 
 
10.742 
   x Unemploymentt-1 
  
  
 
(22.681) 
 
(28.363) 
GDP PPS per  0.012*** 0.002 0.004 -0.000 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.002 
   capitat-1 (x 103) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Tax ratet-1 -0.509* 0.634*** -0.346 0.498*** -0.416 -0.509* 0.637*** 
 
(0.272) (0.122) (0.234) (0.121) (0.300) (0.272) (0.122) 
Between regions -0.366 -1.207*** -0.234 -1.138*** -0.538 -0.366 -1.203*** 
    inequalityt-1 (0.730) (0.387) (0.669) (0.362) (0.730) (0.730) (0.394) 
Wage sharet-1 -0.035 0.400* 0.467 0.601*** 0.103 -0.035 0.407* 
 
(0.300) (0.212) (0.351) (0.163) (0.370) (0.300) (0.214) 
Growth Dummyt-1 -0.018 -0.107*** -0.017 -0.093*** -0.014 -0.018 -0.106*** 
 
(0.016) (0.025) (0.017) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016) (0.026) 
   
  
    Observations 489 489 521 521 489 489 489 
Cencored 127 255 136 287 127 127 255 
Uncencored 362 234 385 234 362 362 234 
Number of clusters 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo R2 0.522 0.336 0.535 0.326 0.479 0.522 0.345 
Joint-significance Wald χ2 93.44 104.13 101.5 118.08 92.09 93.440 101.66 
Notes: this table reports the results of panel Tobit estimations after Honorè (1992) of the European extreme right (ER) and populist 
radical right (PRR) vote shares 2000-2014, testing hypotheses 1, 2 (model 1) and 3 (models 2 and 3).  We check for robustness of 
results to excluding all European elections plus countries that extend (partial) voting rights to immigrants in national elections. 
Model 2 uses %Immigration (ratio of immigrants to population), and model 3 uses Δ(%immigration) (changes in %immigration). 
Standard errors are given in parentheses below the coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors' calculations based on electoral and Eurostat data. 
 
 
